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Abstract
This thesis examines and reassesses the reign of the Roman 
emperor Gallienus in the mid-third century CE.  Specifically, this 
paper analyses Gallienus’ military and administrative policies, his 
conception of his emperorship, and the influence his policies had on 
his successors.Gallienus ruled over the Roman Empire during a 
period of unprecedented calamities.  The misfortunes of the Roman 
Empire during this period, and the biases against Gallienus in the 
writings of the ancient Latin authors, left a less-than-favorable 
impression of Gallienus’ reign.  However, a re-evaluation of Gallienus 
and his policies unveils a remarkably capable emperor, who should 
be credited with not only saving the Roman Empire from complete 
collapse, but laying the foundation for the Empire’s recovery in the 
late third century CE.
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1Introduction
The third century of the Roman Empire was a particularly tumultuous 
period, and the role of the emperor had shifted to be primarily based 
around his relationship, and success with, his legions. Noted for the dearth 
of comprehensive contemporary sources that can be reliably drawn upon 
to make any accurate assessment of the century, the window for differing 
opinions is considerably wider than for other periods of the Roman Empire.  
The third century, or more specifically the period from 235 to 285 (all dates 
are CE unless otherwise noted), was characterized by chronic warfare 
and calamities never before witnessed in Rome’s history.  This was the 
period of the soldier-emperor, and commonly referred to by present day 
scholars as the ‘crisis’.1
In the midst of this period reigned P. Licinius Egnatius Gallienus 
(Gallienus), as joint ruler with his father from 253-260, and then sole 
emperor from 260-268.  This period has been recognized as comprising the 
darkest days of the Empire, and because of that the importance of 
Gallienus’ rule has been largely disregarded.  The goal of this thesis is a re-
evaluation of Gallienus as Roman emperor, not only his role in saving the 
Empire from total collapse, but the influence his policies had on his 
successors and the recovery of the Empire in the years following his death.  
                                                          
1 John Drinkwater, “Maximinus to Diocletian and the ‘Crisis’”, in Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 
XII, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 65.
2When dealing with the mid-third century, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the lack of reliable sources available, and the subsequent
problem that leads to in attempting to produce an accurate depiction of 
the peoples and events during this period.  The introduction will provide 
an overview of the major sources and some of the problems historians 
have had to try to overcome when piecing together a comprehensive 
picture of the period.  A brief narrative of the events that unfolded from 
253-268 will follow the description of the major sources in order to outline 
the numerous complications Gallienus and his administration faced.
From the death of Marcus Aurelius to the reign of Gordian III (180-
244), we have the luxury of the contemporary historians Cassius Dio and 
Herodian.  Dio lived from approximately 163 to 229 and is very valuable as 
a source for this period, as he witnessed many of the events he describes.  
Dio was even a consul in 205 and served in this capacity again alongside 
Severus Alexander in 229.2  It comes as no surprise, however, that Dio’s 
works are written with a senatorial bias, as we see in his treatment of 
Commodus, who is made out to be a monstrous emperor (and just so 
happened to hold an anti-senatorial stance).3 In addition, some of his 
writings have only been transmitted in the form of epitomes created in the
                                                          
2 Oliver Hekster, Rome and its Empire, AD 193-284, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 2008), 7.
3 Cassius Dio, Dio’s Roman History, trans. Earnest Cary (London: W. Heinemann, 1914-27), 73.
3eleventh and twelfth centuries by the monks Zonaras and Xiphilinus.4  
Herodian writes from a non-senatorial view, and though contemporary 
with the events he describes, it has been argued that his ‘anecdotal style’
leads him to ignore facts at times, and hence he is often considered
somewhat less than reliable.5  Nevertheless, the Greek writer is still a 
valuable source, but unfortunately only covers the first three years of the 
‘crisis of empire’. 
From Gordian III to Carinus (283), we have to depend, for the most 
part, on the imperial biographies of Aurelius Victor, Eutropius, and Festus.  
Not only were all of these works written in the fourth century, but it is also
believed that they all drew from a single lost work, also of the fourth 
century: the so-called Kaisergeschichte (KG). This theory was first 
postulated by Alexander Enmann in 1883 after he found similarities 
between the texts.6 Enmann noticed that the epitomizers Victor and 
Eutropius made the same mistakes, shared similar wording and 
phraseology, and generally recounted the same events in much the 
same order.  An example of this, pointed out by R.W. Burgess, is an error in 
the chronology of the usurpation and death of Nepotianus (Vic. 42.6-8, 
Eutr. 10.11.2), which happened in 350, yet both epitomizers place in 351.7  
                                                          
4 Hekster, 8.
5 Michael Grant, The Ancient Historians, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 345.
6 Drinkwater, 65.
7 R.W. Burgess, “On the Date of the Kaisergeschichte,” Classical Philology vol.90, no.2 (April 
1995): 119.
4Enmann’s theory has since been widely accepted, and other ancient
historians are believed to have consulted the KG as well (relevant to this 
paper, in addition to those historians already mentioned, are  Ammianus 
Marcellinus and the author of the Historia Augusta).  Another source exists 
in the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, which is valuable as it is the only 
contemporary written account covering political events of the Roman 
Empire between 238 and the reign of Constantine. Even this source, 
however, is notoriously opaque, as the Greek text is based on supposed 
prophecies from an oracle. The mention of Christian persecutions have 
also led some historians to believe it was written by a Christian, or that it 
was at least subject to Christian interpolation.8
The period’s major historical source is the Historia Augusta (HA), 
which is renowned for its fabrications and inaccuracies, making it
frequently unreliable and further compounding the problem of examining
the period.9  The HA claims to be a collection of biographies from multiple 
authors concerning various second and third century emperors (Hadrian 
to Numerian), and thus gives an overview of all the emperors and usurpers 
within that period.10 The current consensus, however, is that the HA is the 
work of a single author of the late fourth century, in large part due to 
evidence of a single author’s idiosyncrasies found throughout the text, 
                                                          
8 Hekster, 9.
9  Richard Lim, “The Later Roman Empire”, in the Oxford Handbook of Roman Studies, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), 549.
10 Hekster, 8.
5such as the consistent use of synonyms like interficio and occido.11 Other 
problems include the fact that the biographies of emperors between 244 
and 253 have been lost, and the biographies of the Valeriani are only 
fragmentary. The HA is also regarded as being written from the 
perspective of the non-Christian, senatorial aristocracy of Rome, and the 
emperors are assessed in terms of their behavior toward that class.12 In 
addition, much of the content (including documents, events and names)
in the biographies is pure fiction.   Some of the earlier ‘lives’ contain useful 
information, most likely because the author consulted earlier original 
sources for the period. This information, however, must be cross-
referenced with other more reliable literary or archaeological sources to 
confirm its veracity.13  Apart from the HA, historians have to rely largely on 
non-contemporary authors such as the aforementioned Aurelius Victor 
and Eutropius, as well as the works of Zosimus, Zonaras, Dexippus, and 
Eusebius, amongst others I will discuss.
The dubious nature of the literary sources compels the modern 
historian to rely extensively on other forms of evidence.  Epigraphy has 
long been very helpful in providing details of social, political and military 
history.  Unfortunately, the commissioning of inscriptions became more 
rare as the third century progressed for reasons largely unknown (perhaps 
                                                          
11 J.N. Adams, “On the Authorship of the Historia Augusta,” The Classical Quarterly, New Series, 
vol.22, no.1 (May 1972): 186.
12 Inge Mennen, Power and Status in the Roman Empire, AD 193-284 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 15.
13 Hekster, 8.
6because of the economic downturn).14  Some non-Roman inscriptions 
have been particularly useful; a prime example is the Sassanian relief at 
Naqsh-i-Rustam, which depicts Valerian’s capture by Shapur I.15
Numismatic research is important, especially for the later third century, 
when there was an increase in the issue of imperial coins and number of
mints.  The identification of such mints and the analysis of their products
are helpful in establishing names, titles, and the chronology of emperors 
and usurpers, as well as their policies and military campaigns.16  Another 
form of material evidence to consult is papyri, mostly found in Egypt, 
which makes valuable contributions in providing a reliable chronology of 
events.  Building activity seems to have lessened during the third century, 
but archaeological evidence still serves to provide new knowledge and 
confirm other findings.  The walls of Aurelian stand to this day, for example, 
and the necessity of such a defensive precaution around Rome provides 
us with a glimpse of the alarming growth in both the number and 
aggression of attacks from ‘barbarian’ forces along the eastern and 
western frontiers of the Empire in the third century.
The nature of the resources available to analyze the third century 
has provided a major challenge to historians trying to piece together this 
period of ‘crisis’, and any theories of this period will perhaps always be 
                                                          
14 Drinkwater, 65.
15 Fergus Millar, The Roman Empire and its Neighbors (New York: Delacorte Press, 1966), 219.
16 Drinkwater, 66.
7highly debated. Though this period has traditionally been largely 
overlooked as compared with the other, more thoroughly documented
stages of the Roman Empire, such as the reign of Augustus, there has 
been a fair amount published on the period since the early 1900s.  Not 
surprisingly, the lack of conclusive evidence, especially for the mid-third
century, has led to, inter alia, differing modern opinions on Gallienus and 
the state of the Empire under his reign.
Before analyzing Gallienus’ reign and taking an in-depth look at the 
character and policies of the Roman emperor, it is necessary to make a 
brief survey of the period in which he ruled. What follows is an attempt to
provide an overview of the state of affairs during Gallienus’ reign and
clarify the chronology of major events from 253-268 AD, though the order 
and even factuality of some events is confusing, and at times 
contradictory in the sources.
The old custom by which emperors invariably came out of the 
senatorial class had long since been discarded by the period under 
discussion; they were now invariably created by the armies.  When the 
soldiers elevated their acclaimed Augustus, he usually informed the 
senators of his appointment and requested their approval, which by the 
mid-third century was just a formality, as the Senate, under threat of 
8coercion, would have no choice but to agree.17 Whether it was due to
familiarity with an elevated commander, hopes of rewards and career 
opportunities, or a genuine belief in the capability of the selected 
candidate, the soldiers declared new emperors frequently, and the 
unfortunate rulers whom they superseded were almost always killed.18  A 
military victory by a frontier commander proved his worth to his own men, 
and coupled with perceived deficiencies or even the prolonged absence 
of the current emperor, was enough reason for frontier troops to attempt 
to raise their own commander to the purple.  The instability of this situation 
paralyzed the empire’s defense system, which did not go unnoticed by 
the Germanic tribes of the Rhine and Danube, or by the Persians to the 
East.  
Raids across the frontier by external forces were nothing new to the 
Empire, but during this period the accelerated frequency and ferocity of 
the attacks were unprecedented.  In the West, the Germanic tribes had 
been forming stronger coalitions amongst themselves since the second
century, providing greater numbers to challenge Roman forces.  In the 
East, the Sassanid Empire overthrew that of the Parthians (224), and 
brought a renewed sense of Persian tradition and vigour to reclaim 
                                                          
17 Michael Grant, The Climax of Rome: The Final Achievements of the Ancient World AD 161-337
(Toronto: Little Brown, 1968), 13.
18 Fik Meijer, Emperors Don’t Die in Bed, trans. S.J. Leinbach (London: Routledge, 2001), 83.
9territory previously lost to the Romans.19  The external pressure and internal 
strife ultimately contributed to the failing financial and economic state of 
the Empire.  The continued existence of the Empire depended on a well-
functioning army, and any security of the throne depended on the 
soldiers’ loyalty, which cost a substantial amount of money and put a 
strain on the finances of the empire.20  By Gallienus’ reign, soldiers’ pay 
had been steadily increasing, and large donations or donativa, of gold 
were now customary and an important part of their income. The high 
cost of maintaining the armies slowed economic development. 
Production and trade were negatively affected, coupled with a 
population decrease (caused by plague) which led to the debasement 
of coins and inflation.21  This was a low ebb in the history of the Roman 
Empire, a situation of which Gallienus found himself in the middle.  
Gallienus’ father, P. Licinius Valerianus, or Valerian, makes his first 
appearance in the sources in 238 AD as an ex-consul and princeps
senatus (leading member of the Senate) negotiating with the embassy 
sent to Rome by Gordian I’s African legions to secure senatorial approval 
of Gordian’s rebellion against the emperor Maximinus Thrax.22  This revolt 
was initiated by the African citizens’ refusal to pay Maximinus’ high taxes, 
                                                          
19 David S. Potter, Empire at Bay, AD 180-395 (London: Routledge, 2004), 218.
20 Meijer, 84.
21 M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1957), 471.
22 Zosimus Historia Nova: The Decline of Rome, trans. James J. Buchanan and Harold T. Davis (San 
Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1967), I.14.
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and supported by the Senate because of its disapproval of the Thracian 
emperor’s low station of birth, in addition to his indifference toward the 
Senate as a whole.23  Valerian, unlike most of the soldier-emperors of this 
period, came from an old senatorial family.  As Mennan notes, Valerian 
and his son Gallienus were the last emperors in the third century who were 
definitely part of the traditional senatorial aristocracy, which no doubt 
meant his ascension to the throne in 253 was a welcome change in the 
eyes of the Roman Senate.24  Valerian immediately named Gallienus 
Caesar in 253 and then elevated him to co-emperor the next year.25 I will 
attempt to place the major events between 253 and 268 in a loose 
chronological order, first dealing with events in the East and then West, 
but the confusing and often questionable sources for the period make 
some statements conjectural rather than factual.
At that time, the Empire was under external pressure from the 
Persian king Sapor I, who launched a massive campaign against Rome 
and its allies in 252-253, so when Valerian left to defend Roman territory in 
the East in 254, he placed Gallienus in charge of the western half of the 
Empire.26  Valerian was able to restore a measure of order in the East, and 
returned to Rome, but peace was short-lived, as Dura Europos and 
                                                          
23 Drinkwater, 30-31.
24 Mennan, 27.
25 Lukas De Blois, The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus (Leinden: E.J Brill, 1976), 1.
26 A. Alfoldi, “The Crisis of Empire AD249-270,”in The Cambridge Ancient History vol. XII, ed. S.A. 
Cook, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 170.
11
Antioch fell to the Persians in 256, which required the emperor to hasten 
back to Syria.27  By 257, however, Valerian was able to recapture Antioch 
and remained there to rebuild the city and protect it from further attacks. 
At this time, however, Asia Minor was suffering from pirate raids by 
the Goths and the Borani, neighboring tribes of the Black Sea region.  The 
Borani acted first, crossing the Black Sea to attack the Roman outpost 
town of Pityus, which was defended admirably by its governor, 
Successianus.28  Valerian, not fearing a subsequent attack in this area, 
sent for Successianus and made him prefect of his guard. The Borani were 
not deterred though, and again crossed the Pontus to attack Pityus, this 
time successfully.  They then captured Trapezus before returning home, 
enriched with booty.29 The Goths soon emulated their neighbors and 
marched on Chalcedon, Nicomedia, Nicaea, Apamea and Prusa 
successively, capturing them all without much opposition and returning 
home with their spoils.30
Valerian, upon hearing of the invasions, sent one of his officers, Felix, 
to take command at Byzantium, as he advanced into Cappadocia to 
reinforce Bithynia.  His expedition was cut short, however, as plague 
ravaged his army, and news came that Sapor was once again 
                                                          
27 Zos. I.31—37.
28 H.M.D Parker, A History of the Roman World from A.D. 138 to 337 (London: Methue & Co., 
1958), 169.
29 Parker, 169.
30 Parker, 170.
12
advancing against Antioch. 31 With a depleted force and, most likely, 
soldiers that were uninspired by the feebleness of their emperor, Valerian 
engaged the Persians outside Edessa in 259.  It was at this time that 
disaster struck not only Valerian and his army but the Empire itself.  
Valerian was captured by the Sassanids.  
This was an unprecedented disgrace; never before had a Roman 
emperor been captured by enemy forces, and the humiliation was felt 
throughout the Empire.32  There are numerous stories about how exactly 
Valerian fell into the Persians’ grasp.  Some ancient sources attest that he 
was captured in battle, while others have Valerian attempting 
negotiations with Sapor or freely handing himself over to the enemy for 
fear of mutiny amongst his own soldiers.33 However the disastrous event 
occurred, most agree that while in Sapor’s custody he was subjected to 
humiliation and his body was later desecrated, perhaps even skinned and 
stuffed to be kept as a trophy.  This lurid detail, however, was probably 
added by Lactantius and subsequently copied by Eusebius: an easy 
explanation for this is that both were Christian writers and saw Valerian’s 
fate as retribution for his earlier persecution of the Christians.34 Valerian
                                                          
31 Alfoldi, 170
32 De Blois, 2.
33 Zonaras, The History of Zonaras, trans. Thomas M. Banchich and Eugene N. Lane (London: 
Routledge, 2009), XII.23
34 D.S. Potter, Prophecy and History in the Crisis of the Roman Empire: A Historical Commentary 
on the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 336; Lactantius, The Manner in which 
the Persecutors Died, trans. Sir David Dalpymple (Edinburgh: Printed by Murray & Cochran, 1782), ch. 5.
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appears to have died a year or so after his capture, leaving Gallienus in 
sole command of the Empire.35
Entrusted with the western half of the Empire by his father, who set 
out to protect the eastern frontier, Gallienus was not idle long, as his 
presence was required on the Rhine and Danube frontiers to defend 
against Germanic invasions as early as 254.36 The first few years of 
Gallienus’ co-emperorship were spent quelling the invasions by the 
Empire’s northern neighbors, which had become endemic.  From his 
accession in 254 through to 259, Gallienus was continually engaged in 
‘fire-fighting’ to defend the borders of the Rhine and Danube.  Though the 
precise chronology of exactly which barbarian tribe attacked, and when,
has been argued and reinterpreted a number of times, I will follow Pat 
Southern’s chronology.37
Gallienus’ first campaign was in Pannonia against the Marcomanni 
in 254, which ended successfully.38  He was soon after called to depart 
from the Danube frontier to face the Franks in Gaul.  Upon his departure, 
he installed his son, P. Licinius Cornelius Valerianus (Valerian the Younger) 
                                                          
35 The date of Valerian’s death is another highly contested subject. Again the lack of quality 
sources and the fact that he was a prisoner make it difficult to know exactly when he died/was executed. 
Most recent works agree, at least, that the date was most likely either 259 or 260, and I am inclined to 
agree with the latter.
36 Michael Grant, The Roman Emperors: A Biographical Guide to the Rulers of Imperial Rome 31 
BC-AD 476 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985), 168.
37 Pat Southern, The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine (Taylor & Francis, 2001), 216.
38 De Blois, 4.
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as Caesar.39  Reaching the Rhine frontier with his army, Gallienus 
established his headquarters at Cologne, also moving the imperial mint 
there from Viminacium to facilitate paying his Rhine troops, who had 
temporarily quelled the unrest on the frontier.40  Again, in 256, Gallienus 
led his armies to victory over the Franks in Gaul; this year also saw the 
Goths raid the settlements around the Black Sea.  Shortly after, in 258, the 
threat of a renewed invasion by the Marcomanni inspired the usurpation 
of Ingenuus, governor of Pannonia.  Usurpers were nothing new to the 
emperors of the third century, but Ingenuus was the first of the challengers 
to the throne that Gallienus had to deal with while simultaneously 
defending the frontiers.41
It is likely that Valerian the Younger was killed in the revolt of 
Ingenuus, and after Gallienus put down the revolt, he came to an 
agreement with Attalus, the chief of the Marcomanni, which allowed the 
Marcomanni to possess land in Pannonia in exchange for guarding the 
Roman border. In addition, Attalus’ daughter, Pipa, was given to 
Gallienus, allegedly as a concubine.42  This agreement to conscript a 
barbarian tribe to defend Roman territory speaks to the desperate 
situation in which Gallienus found himself at that time.  
                                                          
39 Alfoldi, 181.
40 Southern, 78.
41 De Blois, 4.
42 De Blois, 4.
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Though he was successful in defending the Empire’s borders in the 
first few years, as commemorated on coins with titles such as restitutor 
Galliarum (restorer of Gaul), the frontier situation was unraveling quickly.43  
The Roman Empire was being threatened on four fronts in 258.  While 
Valerian was occupied in the East by the Persians, and Gallienus was re-
establishing authority over Illyricum, the Alamanni began threatening the 
frontiers of Germany and Raetia, while the Goths were attacking the 
Black Sea coastal settlements.44  
The impossibility of defending all of the western provinces meant 
some regions would be left to fend for themselves.  After Valerian the 
Younger’s death, Gallienus had installed his younger son, P. Licinus 
Cornelius Saloninus, as Caesar. Saloninus was left at Cologne while 
Gallienus returned to northern Italy and set up new headquarters at Milan 
and braced for battle against the Alamanni.45 It was now 260, a year of 
seemingly relentless disasters which Alfoldi refers to as “one of 
catastrophes unexampled in Roman history.”46
The capture of the emperor Valerian by Shapur allowed the 
Persians to take control of the East, being unchecked for the first time.  
Whether it was because of the capture of one of the emperors, or a self-
                                                          
43 H. Mattingly. et al, The Roman Imperial Coinage (RIC) V.5, pt.1. Gallienus 27-35. (London: 
Spink, 1994), 
44 Southern, 79.
45 De Blois, 7.
46 Alfoldi, 182.
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help solution against the sheer number of threats on the frontier, usurpers 
appeared in several places in 260.47  The same troops who had 
proclaimed the short-lived Ingenuus as emperor now raised Regalianus, 
the governor of Pannonia, to the purple at Carnuntum to fight against 
various barbarian tribes, though he held this position no more than a few 
weeks before being crushed by Gallienus.48  Meanwhile, the remnants of 
the eastern army left by Valerian chose Callistus (referred to as Ballista in 
some sources) and Macrianus, two generals, to lead them; it should be 
noted that neither of them declared themselves emperors, but Macrianus 
was quick to raise his two sons, Titus Fluvius Junius Macrianus and Titus 
Fluvius Junius Quietus, to Augusti.49
When the news of Valerian’s demise reached Gaul, the soldiers 
there too declared their governor, Postumus, emperor.  Postumus, with the 
support of the Rhine army, besieged the young Caesar Saloninus and his 
tutor Silvanus at Cologne, eventually taking the town and executing them 
both.50  Gallienus was preoccupied with the Alamanni advance into Italy, 
meaning he could neither attempt a rescue of his father in the East, nor 
march on Postumus. This allowed Postumus to consolidate his position, 
eventually gaining Gaul, Britain and a large portion of Spain, which 
formed the “Imperium Galliarum” (Gallic Empire), an entity which 
                                                          
47 Southern, 79.
48 Alfoldi, 185. Note: P. Southern believes the tribes in question to be the Iazyges and Roxolani.
49 Southern, 79.
50 De Blois, 6.
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remained until 273.51  With Gallienus hemmed in at Milan fighting the 
Alamanni, Macrianus and his eldest son of the same named marched on 
Rome, leaving his other son, Quietus, and Callistus in charge of the 
eastern provinces.  Gallienus sent his general, Aureolus, to engage the 
two Macriani, which he did successfully, defeating them in Pannonia.52  
Meanwhile, Gallienus was in need of assistance to deal with not 
only the remaining two usurpers in the East but also the Sassanids.  This aid 
came in the form of a prominent leader of Palmyra, Odenathus.53  
Palmyra had remained loyal under Roman jurisdiction and Odenathus 
had successfully pursued and attacked Shapur as the Persian army 
headed back across the Euphrates.  Odenathus then eliminated Callistus 
and Quietus in the name of Rome, help which Gallienus could ill-afford to 
turn down, and Odenathus’ victory essentially gave him de facto rule 
over the eastern provinces, along with command of the eastern army.54
Though Gallienus had little actual control over Palmyra, Odenathus 
stressed his allegiance to Rome until his death in 267, when his wife 
Zenobia seized control and set out to achieve Palmyra’s independence.55  
In 262, Gallienus returned to Rome to celebrate his Decannalia, or 
tenth year as emperor, a notable achievement in the third century.  It was 
                                                          
51 De Blois, 6.
52 Southern, 100.
53 Hekster, 24.
54 Hekster, 24.
55 Grant, Climax, 19.
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also a time of relative peace, as Gallienus thought better of attacking 
Postumus, who seemed content with the Gallic Empire and made no 
effort to march on Rome.  Between 262 and 265, Gallienus devoted his 
time to literature and the arts, most notably philosophy.  This period of 
peace is again disapproved of by many ancient authors who see 
Gallienus as negligent for not actively campaigning to reunite the Empire. 
In addition, there was still a Gothic threat to the Danube frontier.56
In 265, after preparing his forces, Gallienus finally began to march
on the Gallic Empire, but was called to the Danube in 266 to expel the 
Goths.  This campaign produced no tangible results, and in 267 it 
appeared the Empire was again at the mercy of tribes, generally referred 
to as ‘Scythians’, pressuring the borders.57  Gallienus decided to 
concentrate on Illyricum, and first gained a few victories over the Heruli 
before defeating the tribesmen again at Nestus, when news arrived that 
his trusted general, Aureolus, had raised a revolt in Milan.58  Gallienus left 
another general in charge of the campaign against the Scythians while 
he hastened to Milan to besiege Aureolus.  A plot was hatched, led by
one of his generals, Heraclianus, to assassinate Gallienus during the siege 
of Milan.  There are, again, conflicting accounts of how the event took 
place, but the apparent complicity of Gallienus’ generals, including future 
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emperors Claudius II and Aurelian, points to a general disenchantment 
with him or his policies.  Gallienus was assassinated in July or August of 
268.59
The following content reassesses the significance of Gallienus’ major 
policies and the influence his reign had on the later Empire. The first 
chapter will be an analysis of the military and administrative policies 
undertaken by Gallienus.  Throughout the third century, and especially 
during Gallienus’ reign, the legions were the most important aspect of the 
Empire.  Constant warfare plagued Gallienus throughout his entire reign, 
as he faced both internal and external enemies, often simultaneously.  This 
meant the fate of the Empire would hinge on the success of his legions, 
and the effectiveness of the policies he implemented.  
Chapter Two examines Gallienus’ conception of his emperorship.  
The numismatic evidence of his reign reveals the messages Gallienus felt it 
was important to propagate to the Empire.  Gallienus also fostered culture 
in his court to a degree not seen by any of his immediate predecessors.  
The revival of art and philosophy and the images minted on his coins and 
medallions are revealing of a spirituality Gallienus fostered, which would 
have a great influence on his successors and the Late Empire.
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The third chapter defines what makes a typical soldier-emperor, 
and more importantly, why Gallienus does not fit the archetypal mold.  
The chapter will also revisit the Latin authors’ biases against Gallienus, and 
suggest why Gallienus, far from being the inept emperor they portray, 
should have been remembered in the same regard as the ‘good’ 
emperors of Rome’s golden age.  Gallienus’ achievements, even today, 
are undervalued in terms of the role they played in saving the Empire from 
what seemed like certain collapse, and his policies built the foundation 
which would allow his successors to recover and once again find stability 
ruling the Western world’s foremost power.
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Chapter 1
Gallienus made some significant changes to the military and 
administrative structures of the Roman Empire.  The reorganization of the 
army and administrative posts were often not wholly original reforms 
initiated by Gallienus himself, but rather a continuation or revival of 
measures initiated by previous members of the Roman Principate. The 
extent and lasting effects of Gallienus’ reforms, however, were more 
substantial than those of almost all of his predecessors.  Of his military 
reforms, the most significant, and consequently, the most discussed by 
both ancient and contemporary authors, is the formation of his
independent mobile cavalry.  This chapter will address this aspect of 
Gallienus’ military at length as well as other important innovations
regarding the defensive strategy of the Empire and the command 
structure of the legions.  The administrative reforms brought forth by 
Gallienus are not only as important as his military policies, but very much 
intertwined with them.  Under Gallienus, there was a very important power 
shift when it came to military careers, one that saw the rise of the 
equestrian class at the expense of the Senate in both military posts and 
provincial governance.  It was his treatment of the Senate in regards to 
military and provincial administration that led to Gallienus being 
slandered by many ancient historians.
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During Gallienus’ reign, the Empire was in a state of constant war.  
Modern scholars are still debating whether the period between 235 and 
284 was actually a ‘crisis’ or not, but no one can argue that Gallienus’ 
reign came during one of the most tumultuous periods the Empire had 
ever seen.60 Wars, both foreign and civil, were ever- present between 253 
and 268, and therefore it is no surprise that Gallienus’ reforms had mostly 
to deal with the army, with which he was so familiar.61  Gallienus’ fiscal, 
social, political and military policies were all subordinated to the needs of 
the army.62
The independent cavalry unit is amongst the most discussed topics
of Gallienus’ reign.  It was due to this force that Gallienus was able to 
defeat a constant barrage of opponents throughout his reign.  Some 
historians have questioned whether the mobile cavalry was actually a 
strategic reform or just an ad hoc response to dire situations.  Though 
there are differing views in respect to this topic, as is the case for many 
events of this period, the lack of reliable sources makes a single definitive 
answer impossible.  The earliest mentions of the mobile cavalry under 
Gallienus are found in Zosimus and Zonaras, but the sources do not 
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mention a date for the mobile unit’s creation.63  De Blois believes Gallienus 
developed his cavalry around 255, or shortly after, as Gaul at that time 
was under constant pressure from the Alemanni and the Franks, and the 
need for rapid response was paramount.64 By 259, the mobile cavalry unit 
was firmly established in the Roman army and stationed at Milan, attested 
by coins celebrating the loyalty of the cavalry forces being minted in 
Milan in 260.65  Whether the independent mobile cavalry force was 
intended to become a permanent part of the army or not, the 
effectiveness of the unit helped keep the Empire from complete collapse, 
and would influence Gallienus’ successors.
The make-up of the mobile cavalry force is not entirely clear, but it is 
unlikely that Gallienus could have created an effective cavalry force from 
raw recruits and untrained horses.  Rider and mount must undergo 
sufficient training to become a formidable combination.  This process 
takes time, and time was scarcely a commodity that Gallienus could 
afford to waste.66 It is probable that Gallienus selected horseman from 
the corps of mounted auxilia, consisting largely of Mauretanian and 
Dalmatian horseman, presumably because of their riding skill, as well as 
                                                          
63 Zos. I.40; Zon. 12.24.
64 De Blois, 6.
65 Ragnar Hedlund, “…achieved nothing worthy of memory”: Coinage and authority in the Roman 
Empire c.AD 260-295 (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2008), 109.
66 Pat Southern and Karen Ramsey Dixon, the Late Roman Army (Yale University Press, 1996), 12.
24
detachments from the legionary cavalry.67  These equites, as the cavalry 
force was designated on coins, were most likely relatively small in number, 
so as to keep mobility at a premium and not deplete the frontier of too 
many troops.68  The mobile cavalry force proved to be a valuable asset to 
Gallienus; it could be deployed independently from the legions in any 
area that needed aid.  
The mobile cavalry was created as a strike force which could swiftly 
move from one area under duress to another. The force’s mobility was its 
greatest attribute, and it could compensate for inferior numbers by being 
able to promptly supply well-trained soldiers to the weakest points of the 
frontier.69  Given the pressure from so many different enemies, external 
and internal, during Gallienus’ reign, a force that could rapidly move from 
one front to another would prove invaluable. In addition, certain tribes 
such as the Alemanni were reputed to be great horsemen, and it was the 
Alemanni that Gallienus was engaged with in Upper Germany and Raetia 
around 255, which is another reason why the creation of a mobile cavalry 
was seemingly necessary at that time.70
Because of the cavalry’s growing importance to the Empire, the 
general who oversaw the force would have possessed great prestige. 
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Zosimus and Zonaras tell us that Gallienus chose Aureolus as the 
commander, after he had proven himself as an attendant of the imperial 
stables, and he held the position until 267.71 The importance of the mobile 
cavalry would have made Aureolus at least as, if not more, powerful than 
the praetorian prefect.72
It has been established that Gallienus was responsible for 
bringing the cavalry to the forefront of the Roman army.  Mounted forces 
had already been deployed and even gained some great renown under 
previous emperors, in particular the horseman fighting for Maximinus Thrax, 
but it was not until the reign of Gallienus that they made up perhaps the 
most important contingent of the Roman forces.73 However, Gallienus was 
not the first to employ a mobile field force: vexillationes (detachment 
corps) were used for Trajan’s Dacian wars and Marcus Aurelius’ 
Macromannic wars, and raised by Septimius Severus for his II Parthica
legion.  These mobile field armies seemed to serve the same function as 
Gallienus’ cavalry force on the surface.74  Most modern historians (De Blois
and Ferrill to name a couple of prominent writers) put Gallienus’ mobile 
cavalry in the same category with previous mobile field armies, as 
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essentially ad hoc emergency forces, but there are a few distinct 
differences between Gallienus’ forces and those of his predecessors.75
It was common practice during the wars of the earlier Empire to 
assemble troops from one province and temporarily shift them to another, 
whether for offensive or defensive purposes. These vexillationes were 
operating outside of their regular units with the intention of returning to 
them at some point, and therefore could not be given the title legio, ala
or cohors (units assigned to a particular area).76 The title given to 
Gallienus’ body of cavalry was equites, and while this does not suggest 
the permanence of the previously listed titles, it also is different from the 
term vexillatio, a label usually given to a unit which was clearly intended 
to be short-term.77  Pat Southern notes an inscription (ILS 569) dating from 
the reign of Claudius Gothicus (268-270), once a commander of the 
mobile cavalry, which makes a distinction between the temporary 
detachments and the independent cavalry, further indicating that the 
cavalry troops were not considered part of the vexillationes.78   
The cavalry force operated separately from the main body of the 
army and had an independent command structure, another departure 
                                                          
75 De Blois, 29; Arther Ferrill, The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation, (New York: 
Thames and Hudson Inc, 1986), 32; Alfoldi, 214. 
76 Southern and Dixon, 9.
77 Southern and Dixon, 13.
78 Southern, 90., ILS 569. The inscription vexillationes adque equites suggests the cavalry was not 
absorbed with other units or merged with the vexillations.
27
from earlier vexillations, and it was attached to the emperor’s own person 
when he was present, both characteristics of Diocletian’s and 
Constantine’s permanent comitatenses.79 Furthermore, the sheer 
importance of the mobile cavalry distinguishes it from earlier vexillations; 
Aureolus, the first commander as mentioned above, held power second 
only to Gallienus at the helm of the cavalry force, and after him, Claudius 
Gothicus and Aurelian held the post and used it as a platform to 
eventually become emperors themselves.80
It has been suggested that Gallienus had no intentions to make his 
independent mobile cavalry unit permanent because of a lack of 
evidence supporting the cavalry’s presence in Milan after 283, and 
furthermore, that the cavalry unit had been broken up and redeployed to 
different locations.81 De Blois advocates that since the Gallic Empire had 
been recovered by that time, and was no longer a threat, the cavalry 
was disbanded just as any other vexillation would have been.  However, 
the lack of evidence for the presence of the cavalry in Milan could simply 
have meant that the force was permanently in the field with the current 
emperor, as Southern suggests.82  The frequent campaigns of Probus (276-
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282), Carus, and his sons (282-285) could allow this possibility.83  
Furthermore, just because the independent cavalry unit may not have 
been stationed in Milan, does not necessarily mean it was disbanded all 
together.
As previously discussed, epigraphic evidence (ILS 569), and a 
passage in the HA verify that the cavalry was still employed under 
Claudius Gothicus.84 In addition, Zosimus records the cavalry being used 
by Claudius as well as Aurelian (270-275).85  The lack of evidence makes it 
impossible to connect Gallienus’ mobile cavalry to later comitatenses with 
certainty, but it does not disprove this supposition either.  With the 
importance placed on the cavalry unit, and the central role it played in 
Gallienus’ army, it is improbable that the emperor did not see the value of 
a permanent mobile force.  
Many modern scholars are too eager to dismiss the possibility of 
Gallienus viewing the mobile cavalry as a permanent unit.  It is probable 
that it was initially created to deal with an emergency situation along the 
Rhine, but after the initial and continued success of the mobile force, why 
would Gallienus plan to disband it?  Throughout Gallienus’ reign, the 
Empire was in a constant state of warfare (with the exception of a 
relatively peaceful period in 265-266), and in many instances numerous 
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fronts were simultaneously threatened, making an independent mobile 
force invaluable. It is also evident that his cavalry was utilized by his 
immediate successors and foreshadowed later mobile field armies, 
whether the mobile cavalry unit remained in constant deployment after 
283 or not.  Regardless of Gallienus’ intention, the independent mobile 
cavalry unit was an important strategic deployment; one that proved 
crucial in the survival of the Empire, and was utilized by his successors.
Situating the mobile cavalry’s headquarters at Milan was another 
strategic move to defend multiple fronts.  The base in northern Italy was in 
an optimal position for the cavalry force to quickly reach the Danube and 
Rhine provinces, as well as guard the Alpine passes against invasion. In 
addition, and perhaps most important to Gallienus, Milan was in a position 
after 259 to defend the western passes against the troops of Postumus, 
who had successfully created his Gallic Empire by then.86
Gallienus’ choice of Milan for the mobile cavalry’s headquarters 
could also support the idea of long-term planning.  Some modern authors 
refer to Milan as being little more than a frontier outpost, only relevant so 
long as Postumus was a threat, but if Gallienus did intend for his mobile 
cavalry force to be permanent, then Milan made sense for other 
reasons.87 As mentioned earlier, Milan was in a strategic position in 
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northern Italy, with relatively easy access to the Rhine, Danube, and Gaul.  
It was also situated in fertile territory, and (as Southern and Dixon point 
out) the fertile surrounding lands, coupled with the ease of obtaining  and 
transporting goods to its central location, made Milan an optimal base for 
a military force dependent on horses.88  It should be noted that this 
remains true whether there was a threat from Gaul or not.  Milan’s 
importance to the Empire is further supported by later emperors taking up 
residence there.  The Tetrarchs chose Milan as one of their imperial 
residences, and Honorius based his court there in the 4th century.89  Milan 
was arguably the power centre of Gallienus’ empire, perhaps not by 
choice but by necessity as a strategic point in the Empire’s defense.
Gallienus was also active in developing new fortifications and 
defense strategies, as well as alliances to help defend the numerous 
threatened frontiers.  Along with Milan, other strategic points, well back of 
the frontiers, were also used as staging posts for Roman forces.  Alfoldi lists 
Aquileia and Verona as other points in Italy where mobile units were 
stationed, in addition to Sirmium and Poetovio in Pannonia, which barred 
the major routes south of the Danube, and Lychnidus in Upper 
Macedonia, which guarded the Via Egnatia across the Balkan 
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peninsula.90 The vexillationes stationed at these strategic points all put 
emphasis on mobility to defend against attacks to the frontier.  This system 
of defense-in-depth was intended to check the constant waves of 
barbarian invaders threatening various points of the frontier, until it 
eventually became entrenched, and this “elastic” form of defense 
ultimately replaced the old rigid system of border defense as the Roman 
strategy.91  The new military centres usually included mints and arms 
factories, making them self-sufficient, and thus facilitating the desired 
mobility of the nearby troops.92 Gallienus proved skillful in reacting to the 
emergency situations he faced: this elastic defense was not an entirely
new strategy, but again it was successful against the unrelenting 
succession of invasions, and it foreshadowed the definitive system 
organized by Constantine.93  
During Diocletian’s reign, he was faced with different and more 
favorable circumstances than Gallienus, which gave him the luxury of 
time to plan out and reorganize most facets of the Empire, one of which 
was the border system of defense.  This was also made possible with the
enlargement of the army under the Tetrarchs.94  Constantine, however, 
was faced with a more desperate situation, often dealing with multiple 
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and sometimes simultaneous threats to the Empire.  Constantine’s 
situation was similar to Gallienus’, and so he reverted back to an elastic 
defense system, a testament to not only the effectiveness of the defense-
in-depth system during times of duress, but also of the influence Gallienus’ 
reforms had on the later Empire.95
It was becoming increasingly hard throughout his reign for Gallienus 
to be able to defend all frontiers under pressure, not only because of the 
increasing frequency with which the frontier was threatened but also 
because of a diminished stock of military man-power within the Empire, 
due to a plague that began around 251.  In response, Gallienus struck 
alliances which delegated the defense of certain frontiers to other 
capable commanders.96  This is not unlike what Valerian attempted to do 
by handling problems in the East while giving Gallienus the task of 
safeguarding the West, and this policy was also used by Marcus Aurelius 
when he assigned Lucius Verus (161-166) to handle a Syrian threat in 161-
162.97  This delegation of responsibility can even be viewed as a precursor 
to the tetrarch system, which made the separation of the Empire amongst 
the four emperors official.  Zosimus records Gallienus making an alliance 
with the chief of a German tribe, around 256, to prevent other tribes from 
crossing the Rhine, but details of the terms of this particular alliance are 
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virtually non-existent .98 However, two years later, Gallienus made a treaty 
with Attalus, a Marcomanni chief, ceding to him parts of Pannonia in 
return for his daughter, Pipa, who allegedly became Gallienus’ 
concubine.99  This alliance proved that Gallienus had the sense to 
negotiate when it served his purpose, and with the Empire under such 
duress, this agreement would relieve much pressure on the Roman troops 
of the region.  Yet, it drew criticism from ancient authors such as Victor, 
who used the “shameful” relationship between emperor and concubine 
to further discredit Gallienus’ rule.100  In contrast, Victor often praises the 
emperor Constantine (306-337), who incidentally would reach a similar 
agreement with the Sarmatians (334), which absorbed the tribe into the 
Empire.  This displays an evident bias Victor held against Gallienus that will 
be discussed in more detail in following chapters.101  
Gallienus would forge similar alliances in other parts of the Empire as 
well: his agreement with Odenathus of Palmyra granted the latter nominal 
command over the East.  While Odenathus enjoyed free reign in the East, 
he always stressed his allegiance to Rome.102 This particular alliance would 
prove very valuable for Gallienus, as Odenathus was quite a capable 
commander.  Leading the Palmyran forces, Odenathus was able to inflict 
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overwhelming defeats on the Sassanid Empire in 260, and then launched 
his own offensive against Persia in 262, recovering Mesopotamia and 
Armenia, and forcing the Persians back to Ctesiphon before they were 
able to repel him.103  Odenathus also put down revolts in the East, 
defeating the usurpers Callistus and Quietus in 262.  Macrianus and his 
eldest son were in league with Callistus and Quietus when the former were
cut down by Aureolus and the mobile cavalry, leaving Gallienus to invite 
Odenathus to finish the victory by turning on Macrianus’ former associates 
Callistus and Quietus.  Odenathus accepted the emperor’s offer, 
successfully defeated the usurpers at Emesa, and was rewarded by 
Gallienus with the title corrector totius orientis or “Defender of the Whole 
East”.  For his victories over Sapor and the Persians, Odenathus assumed 
the title “King of Kings”, a lofty title which Potter interprets as a direct 
challenge to the other holder of that title, Sapor, and therefore also 
proclaiming loyalty to Rome. 104  
The agreement between Gallienus and Odenathus was a fruitful 
one; it secured the East in the name of the Empire without Gallienus 
having to withdraw any further troops from the West.  When Odenathus 
was murdered in 268, his titles were passed to his son Vaballathus, but his 
wife Zenobia was effectively the new ruler, acting as her son’s regent.  
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Zenobia would prove to be a problem for the Empire, as she fought for 
independence from Rome, and would attempt to create her own empire 
including Asia Minor, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Arabia and Mesopotamia.  
Gallienus, however, would never be able to turn his attention to Zenobia, 
as he was dealing with an invasion of Goths in 267, so she was left to her 
own devices until her defeat at the hands of Aurelian.105
Gallienus realized the limitations of his army and was willing to 
negotiate power and land, in the case of Odenathus, in order to secure 
the Empire’s borders.  His alliance with Odenathus in the East was very 
different from the situation in the West, however, where the usurper 
Postumus secured his own Gallic empire in 259.  Gallienus would be in a 
state of war with the ex-governor of Lower Germany throughout the rest 
of his reign.106  Postumus was able to retain his Gallic empire for so long 
because both he and Gallienus were often preoccupied engaging 
Germanic tribes in battle. When Gallienus finally did launch a campaign 
against Postumus in 265, he failed to eliminate the usurper despite having 
initial success on the battlefield, due to receiving an arrow wound while 
besieging Postumus at an unnamed Gallic city.107  It is important to note 
that even though Gallienus wanted to defeat Postumus and 
reincorporate the fragmented Western territory, Postumus never 
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threatened to invade Italy, and therefore Gallienus always treated other 
threats to the Empire as a priority.108
Gallienus’ reforms of the military command structure and the 
administration of the provinces would have a profound effect on the 
army and the relationship between various elite groups, and his decisions 
regarding the Senate would be reflected negatively by the ancient Latin 
writers, especially those writers who closely represented the traditional 
conservative Roman senatorial tradition.109
The rise of the equites was initiated long before Gallienus’ reign; 
provinces were put in equestrian hands as early as the first emperor, 
Augustus.  Marcus Aurelius appointed equestrian officers to important 
posts, such as procurator of Dacia, when he was facing many of the 
same problems as Gallienus.110  Septimius Severus continued the trend by 
appointing an equestrian praefectus to govern the northern 
Mesopotamian province acquired during his reign in the 190s.111  From the 
Severan period onward, the number of equestrians replacing senatorial 
governors increased, and Gallienus embraced this pattern.  Aurelius Victor 
famously declared that the senator’s right to a military career was 
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prohibited by Gallienus through an edict, claiming the emperor was afraid 
that the imperial power would be transferred to the best of the nobility
because of his own indolence.112  Victor is the only author to mention this 
edict, however, so it may not actually have existed; he was not entirely 
wrong on the exclusion of senators from the military posts they had 
enjoyed in the past, but the motive he gives Gallienus illustrates Victor’s 
bias against the emperor, especially since the Senate was no longer the 
biggest threat to Gallienus’ throne.  Furthermore, this separation of civil 
and military command would be continued by Gallienus’ successors, and 
fully incorporated in the policies of Diocletian.113  
The high command posts that the equestrian class received from 
Gallienus were not a direct attack on the senators, but rather another 
response to the external and internal problems the Empire was facing.  
Many of the senators simply did not possess the relevant military 
experience that the chaotic period demanded.  The senatorial military 
career had already begun to wane before Gallienus’ reign.  There was
always a considerable number of senators who were not interested in 
pursuing military or even political accolades, but were rather content with 
senatorial rank and prestige.114  Those who aspired for more usually had to 
follow a succession of administrative posts and military offices to gain the 
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prized position of consul, or even important provincial commands.  As 
Southern points out, senators of the earlier Empire who strove for these 
goals would usually combine civilian posts with a term of service in the 
army as tribunes and then legionary legates, but these positions were just 
stepping stones to a better political career, and they did not necessarily 
gain much military experience.115
During the joint reign of Valerian and Gallienus, the title of protector
first appears. The officers who were endowed with the title were from 
diverse units and career backgrounds, so it did not denote a distinct body 
of men.116  Senators were excluded from the title, but that is not surprising, 
as it seems purely a military honour.  The protector title did not denote a 
rank either, but perhaps marked the men as loyal to the Emperor, serving 
as a general mark of distinction.117  It has been hypothesized that the title 
protector was assigned to equestrian military officers who belonged to the 
mobile army staff and found themselves in Gallienus’ entourage.118  It 
would not be surprising that Gallienus bestowed this honorary title on 
select officers in hopes of bringing them closer to him.  In a time of 
constant warfare and usurpation, the loyalty of the army and any chance 
to secure that loyalty would prove invaluable.  The later achievements of 
known protectores, such as Petronius Taurus Volusianus, who rose through 
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the ranks of the army, attained the title protector around 258, and 
eventually became the praetorian prefect, show that they moved on to 
higher office.119  It is clear that when Gallienus awarded this title, he was 
marking such men out for splendid careers.120  This was another innovation 
that was imitated by the later Empire.  Under Diocletian, who had been 
commander of the protectores at the time of his accession to the throne, 
the corps appears to have assumed a role as the emperor’s bodyguard, 
but was made up of junior officers and other men still thought to have 
future potential to climb the ranks.121  The protectores are present under 
Constantine as well, attached to the emperor’s person, and the title 
seems to still have a denotation of loyalty, and the hope of producing 
future officers.122
Under Gallienus, the Empire was in a constant state of duress, and 
an emphasis on military proficiency was necessary.  The exclusion of 
senators from military command, including the disappearance of the 
legati legionis (legion legates) and tribuni laticlavii (senatorial tribunes), 
was a decisive move to ensure that the imperial armies got the very best 
commanders, those of the equestrian class who had risen up through the 
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ranks and had proven themselves competent in battle.123  Gallienus 
certainly took steps to make sure most provinces and armies were led by 
equestrians; however, those provinces that were not affected by any 
military threat or long-term problems, such as Africa and Asia, were left in 
the hands of senatorial governors. There were also non-military but 
important positions in Rome and Italy that continued to go to the 
traditional elite.124 This fact shows that Gallienus was not deliberately 
attempting to slight the Senate, nor was he blindly trying to strip it of 
power, but rather the military concerns of the Empire dictated his 
policies.125
There is a common theme to Gallienus’ military and administration 
policies.  Almost all of them stem from a response to emergency situations.  
While it is generally accepted the mobile cavalry was such a response,  
many modern historians discount the possibility of Gallienus realizing its 
value and making it part of his long-term strategies, yet given the military 
success Gallienus enjoyed, it seems improbable that he would have 
abandoned such a force.  It is impossible to prove that any of the other 
reforms were intentionally meant to be permanent; however, they 
showcase Gallienus’ ability to react swiftly to any number of difficult 
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situations and to do so with competence.  His reforms were almost always 
to the benefit of the soldiers, and Gallienus greatly increased their social 
mobility, giving them more posts to achieve and quicker paths to get 
there. High ranking officers now enjoyed social status that may have been 
viewed as equal to that of the Senate, and at any rate, those born of 
humble origins did not need to be elected into the Senate to enjoy 
prosperous careers.126  
The anti-senatorial bias Gallienus was accused of by Latin writers is 
inaccurate.  The Senate certainly did suffer from some of his policies, but 
this was neither the Senate’s fault nor Gallienus’; these measures were 
simply necessary to ensure the armies had reliable and proven 
commanders to safeguard the Empire.  With many military careers now 
blocked for the senatorial elite, and many military men able to reach lofty 
goals without any sort of civilian career, Gallienus’ reforms inadvertently 
brought about the professionalism and specialization of the army.127  
Though many of Gallienus’ reforms have roots in previous periods, 
Gallienus took many strides that, if not directly imitated by his successors, 
certainly represent an important preparatory period for what was to 
come.
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Chapter 2
Gallienus’ conception of the emperorship can be studied through 
the images created, and the cultivation of philosophy and the arts he 
championed during his lengthy reign.  In contrast to the dearth of reliable 
contemporary written sources for the period of 253-268, there is a wealth 
of numismatic evidence, in addition to some well-preserved portrait 
sculptures that provide an insight into Gallienus’ image of his empire, or at 
least how he wanted it to be perceived among his people.  Studying the 
‘propaganda’ of the coins and medallions in this chapter gives us an 
insight to the messages Gallienus felt it necessary to propagate and why.  
In addition, the resurgence of philosophy and the arts fostered in 
Gallienus’ court reflect important ideals he had of his emperorship.
The first part of the chapter takes a look at some of the broad 
themes found on the coins and medallions of Gallienus’ reign, in particular 
those themes that frequently reoccur, emphasizing their importance.  In 
addition, it is helpful to note the differences in major themes of the 
coinage minted during Gallienus’ co-regency with Valerian as compared 
to that of his sole reign.  From 260 onward, imperial decisions were 
Gallienus’ exclusively, and we see a deliberate attempt on his part to 
disenfranchise himself from his father’s administration.128  Consequently, in 
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trying to distance himself from Valerian, Gallienus ended his father’s 
persecution of the Christians, and coupled with the divine imagery on his 
coins, we get a glimpse of Gallienus’ religious policies and his spiritual 
beliefs.  
The second part of this chapter relates Gallienus’ spiritual 
philosophy to the cultural and artistic revival of his court.  Plotinus, a Greek 
philosopher, played a central role in Gallienus’ philhellenistic views of 
culture.  These cultural elements were fostered by Gallienus and led to 
what modern historians have dubbed the ‘Gallienic renaissance’.129  
Whether this is rightfully termed a renaissance has been widely debated, 
but what is significant is the effect it had upon the art of the period, 
particularly the portrait sculptures made of Gallienus.  During his reign, art 
and philosophy made a transition between the classical and post-
classical world that would leave its impression on the later Empire.130  
Images, whether on coins, medallions, or sculptures, provided a means of 
communication from emperor to the Empire, and on the brink of collapse 
it was more important than ever to reassure the people of their empire’s 
safety and their emperor’s merits.  Fostering a resurgence of philosophy 
and the arts in the imperial court was another way Gallienus displayed 
what he conceived as essential to an admirable administration.  The 
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growing sense of spirituality displayed in the coins and portraits reflect 
Gallienus’ desperation to associate himself with the gods and propagate 
his rule by divine right.  This pattern is influential in the style of his successors 
and the later Empire.
The images that an emperor projects to his subjects reveal much 
about the values of his administration and the state.  Hedlund argues that 
the communication through images used by the soldier-emperors was an 
attempt to legitimize their positions through a communication of shared 
values, such as references to the military and Rome.  The “language of 
images” that was represented on coins was also meant to reach across 
the whole Empire, and subsequently, to integrate the Empire into the 
community that was Rome.131
In reference to Roman imperial coinage, the term ‘propaganda’ 
has frequently been a topic of debate, because it generally carries 
negative implications: as Meadows and Williams suggest, “… the word 
propaganda has far too many inappropriate and anachronistic 
connotations attached to it.”132  However, the phrase is appropriate as 
long as it is stripped of modern connotations, and I will apply it in accord 
with the following definition: “The deliberate attempt to influence public 
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opinion through the transmission of ideas and values for a specific 
purpose.”133  
Hedlund also brings up the question of whether the coins speak of 
reality or of ideals. For instance, Gallienus was largely dependent on his 
cavalry forces, and issued a coin referring to the newly-formed unit (the 
reverse depicted Concordia holding a patera and rudder on globe with 
the legend CONCORD EQVIT (unity of the cavalry).134  It could be 
interpreted that this image was a reference to the fact that Gallienus 
based his power upon the cavalry, or to maintain the cavalry’s loyalty; 
however, others might argue that the coin’s purpose was to convince the 
Empire that the cavalry supported Gallienus.  Whether the intention of the 
coin was to affect public opinion or state reality, all that is known for 
certain is that the cavalry played a significant role in Gallienus’ empire. 
The exact messages of the coins might be difficult to discern, yet 
whatever the images are, they were intentional, and expressed the values 
and/or groups that were relevant to the Empire at the time they were 
struck.135
One last numismatic question that should be discussed is who was 
actually responsible for the choice of images?  It has been suggested that 
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the choices of images were made by the mint-masters, either in an effort 
to communicate with the emperor or an attempt to simply mint what 
images they thought best for their patron.136  This view is highly unlikely, 
especially during a period of instability like that of Gallienus’ reign. The 
imperial images struck on coins and medallions played an important role 
in how the emperor was perceived, and therefore would probably have 
been, at the very least, chosen in consultation with the emperor.
Herodian, for example, mentions an episode when Septimius Severus (193-
211), having named Claudius Albinus Caesar (193), ordered Albinus’ 
likeness to be struck on coins.137  Herodian’s account reveals the emperor 
directly dictating to the Senate the content of the next coins to be struck.
The coins themselves featured obverse and reverse images, 
consisting of different insignia and inscriptions. The obverse portrait acts
as a sign of the issuing authority, and the most common image used was 
the imperial portrait.  The majority of the Empire would never actually see 
the emperor, so his portrait on coins and sculptures would be the only way 
for the people to familiarize themselves with their ruler.  More importantly, 
as the imperial age progressed, coin portraits depicting the emperor 
tended to focus on the role of the emperor, instead of the emperor as a 
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person.138  This was accomplished through the depiction of signs of 
imperial authority, such as the emperor holding a scepter or globe and 
wearing a crown.   
The reverse imagery was depicted with a little more artistic license, 
and its goal was to deliver the message of the emperor.  Wallace-Hadrill 
uses three broad themes to classify reverse images: personal badges, 
honours, and deities and personifications of virtues.  The image was used 
in conjunction with the obverse portrait to represent the authority of the 
emperor: if the emperor’s bust is a symbol of the central power of the 
state, then the reverse image serves to show why he is in that position and 
deserves respect, by highlighting virtues or tributes of the emperor or a 
special connection with the gods.139   
The obverse and reverse legends add clarity, and at times depth, to 
the portrait.  The legends are a written text of imperial titles that represent 
developments, usually political, throughout the Empire.140 Often these 
legends are in abbreviated form to fit the coin or medallions.  All of these 
varying features make for an extremely diverse amount of combinations 
with which the emperor could communicate his message.  The 
ideological importance of coins as a communication medium is made 
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clear by the repeated and continuous introduction of new types 
throughout an emperor’s reign, no matter how long they held power.  The 
significance of coins is also apparent as they were issued immediately 
following any claim to power, whether that claim was from an emperor, 
usurper or vassal ruler, it was a priority to display their authority on coins as 
soon as possible.141
In a recent study, Erika Manders has divided the coin types found in 
the Royal Imperial Coinage (RIC) into fourteen ‘categories of 
representation’.142  While acknowledging that the obverse and reverse of 
the same coin exhibit a reciprocal relationship, Manders’ study focuses on 
the reverses, which she states “...are less static and more susceptible to 
changes than the obverse.  Because of this variation, the messages on 
the types’ reverses are less subtle and therefore provide more distinct 
images of particular emperors and their reigns.”143  This approach is useful 
in distinguishing not only between the vast array of Gallienus’ coins, but 
also the differences in coin types issued from his joint reign with his father 
as compared to those of his sole reign.  
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Throughout the third-century the soldier-emperors all minted coins 
and medallions within the fourteen coin type categories, but what is 
abundantly clear is that there are four major categories that contain the 
vast majority of coins and medallions minted: Of the 8000 coins in the RIC 
database from the third century, 22.5% are ‘military representation’, 19.2% 
promote ‘saeculum aureum’ (golden age), 17.4% glorify ‘virtues’, and 
21.8% represent ‘divine association’.144
The largest category is ‘military representation’, which comes as no 
surprise when considering the chaotic conditions the Empire often faced 
under constant threat of war.  Consequently, as Gallienus ruled through 
arguably the height of the ‘crisis’, it should seem only natural that military 
matters dominated the majority of his coins as well.145  Throughout his 
entire reign, 253-268, coins that fall under the ‘military representation’ 
category make up 26.5% of his total coinage (approximately 1154 coins),
an increase over the norm when considering the third-century as a 
whole.146  
Gallienus’ coins give us one of the best sources to analyze the 
nature of his policies, which, as previously discussed, revolve around an 
emphasis on the army.  The coins minted for the military served various 
functions; first and foremost, coins were payment, and above all, the 
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emperor had to keep his forces regularly compensated. The need to keep 
the soldiers content during economic turmoil led to the continuous 
debasement of the coinage, a practice initiated during the Severan 
dynasty.147  De Blois notes that this was a problem for all third-century 
emperors, who had continued currency debasement and other 
manipulations to keep the army payments up, but he blames Gallienus for 
giving the failing monetary system the extra push which “plunged the 
entire system into chaos once and for all.”148  Gallienus certainly did 
nothing to curtail the economic hardships he inherited, but at the height 
of third-century chaos, when the Empire depended upon the army the 
most, he was left with little alternative.  
To further ensure his troops would receive their due compensation, 
Gallienus established mints in areas where his armed forces were situated, 
Milan and Lugdunum (Lyon) being two examples.  This contributed to the 
decentralization of the imperial mint but serves as another example of 
Gallienus’ dedication to his troops, or at least their rapid payment.149  
Detrimental as Gallienus’ financial policies might have been, he was only 
continuing the trend set before him, which was immortalized by Cassius 
Dio when he recorded the famous advice spoken by Septimius Severus 
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(193-211) to his sons, “be harmonious, enrich the soldiers, and scorn all 
other men.”150
The numerous coins and medallions of Gallienus’ reign referring to 
the military spoke of the overall importance of the military, the loyalty and 
connection the army had with Gallienus, and the claimed or promised 
victories in the name of the Empire.  Within the military category, three 
types of coins are used most frequently, FIDES MILITUM (loyalty of the 
army), VICTORIA (E) AUG. (victory of the emperor), and VIRTUS (military 
valour and capacity).  These are the common legends of the most 
important military coins, but all three types come with additional variants 
to the titles listed.151   
The loyalty of the army was paramount, as it increasingly gained the 
power of king-maker as the third-century progressed.  The relevant 
numismatic images portrayed a respect between Gallienus and his army, 
while at the same time informing the rest of the Empire that Gallienus had 
the support of his troops, further legitimizing his rule.  The most common 
image adorning coins with the Fides Militum legend featured Fides 
(goddess of trust), either standing between two standards, or holding a 
standard and scepter or trophies.152    
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Coins and medallions featuring the VICTORIA (E) AUG. legends 
commonly present an image of Victoria (goddess of victory) with a palm 
or laurel bough, and at times with captives at her feet.153  The message 
could be received a few different ways: either as notice of a successful
campaign launched by Gallienus, a successful campaign handed to 
Gallienus by Victoria (meaning Gallienus was in her good graces), or as 
the promise of a successful campaign to come.  An advertisement of 
victories over an enemy force sent a message of the military competence 
of the emperor, as well as the favour of the gods.  Some modern historians 
have insinuated that Gallienus fabricated some victories that he claimed 
on coins for propaganda purposes, or so he could receive the aurum 
coronarium (gold crown), which was a prize entitled to him upon winning 
a military victory, and so provided another way to levy taxes.  If these 
victories were contrived, however, it cannot be proven, and the fact that 
he actually led numerous successful campaigns has been well 
documented.154  The message to the Empire through these coins is meant 
to give confidence to the soldiers and the people.  Reassurance of the 
Empire’s well-being and success during such a chaotic time was 
important to the continued support of Gallienus.
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Virtus was an essential virtue for any Roman emperor to possess, 
and an emperor reigning in the third-century could not be successful 
without it.  Along with its connection to war, virtus could also signify action 
or exploits on behalf of the state.155   Further, without virtus an emperor 
could not attain victory, and was not worthy of it.  To have the respect 
and loyalty of the military and subjects alike, an emperor had to display 
virtus.  The VIRTUS legend was usually accompanied by campaign-
portraits, such as the emperor armed on horseback, or Hercules dressed 
as a soldier.156  A fragment from the Continuator Dionis tells of an instance 
when Gallienus proved his virtus and personal valour by challenging 
Postumus to single combat, to settle their war and avoid the unnecessary 
bloodshed of their soldiers.157  Such anecdotes and images showed that 
the emperor possessed the traits that entitled him to the throne.  These 
virtus messages displayed a competent leader, which was of utmost 
importance in the mid third-century.
Besides the three major military coin types, Gallienus was noted for 
minting a large number of coins honoring particular legions.  The legionary 
coin series, which featured sixty coin types, was minted between 257 and 
259.158 One hypothesis for this series is that it commemorated actual 
victories; De Blois, however, offers an opinion that it was just a further 
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attempt by Gallienus to advertise his connection with the soldiers, binding 
them to himself to ensure their continued loyalty and support.159  This was 
a necessary maneuver, especially after Valerian was captured in the East, 
when the soldier’s loyalty was vital to Gallienus’ power.  Naming particular 
legions represents a connection between emperor and soldiers on a more 
personal level and, presumably tightens the bond between them.  There 
are many examples of the legionary series, including a particular coin 
minted in Milan featuring a flying Pegasus, which further advertises 
Gallienus’ close connection with the mobile cavalry (figure 2).160
The ‘saeculum aureum’ coin category provided an important 
message to the Empire. The notion of what, exactly, characterized the 
Golden Age differed between authors who wrote about it before or 
during Augustus’ time, such as Vergil, as well as those who wrote much 
later, such as Corippus (sixth century).161 It was viewed on a whole,
however, as a time of peace and prosperity for the Empire. A saeculum is 
also interpreted in various ways: often considered “a generation”, from 
thirty to one hundred years, as well as a definitive one hundred and ten 
years.  By the third-century, however, it most often coincided with an era 
or dynasty.  This would explain why almost every single emperor during the 
third-century claimed a saeculum aureum on their coins.  Though 
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obviously the conditions of the Empire were far from ideal, this 
propaganda was meant to reflect “…promises, wishes, or efforts to 
obscure a reality that was characterized by [grave problems].”162  
Augustus held Secular Games in 17 BCE to commemorate his Golden 
Age, a tradition that was also kept up by Philip the Arab in 247, when he 
combined the Secular Games with a celebration of a millennium since 
Rome’s foundation.163  There was a coin struck in Antioch with the legend 
Saeculares Aug. which may have meant Gallienus planned to hold his 
own Secular Games, although there is no further evidence that he 
actually got around to it.164
Gallienus had to keep reassuring his people that he would 
eventually bring about pax (peace).  By proclaiming the coming of a 
‘golden age’, Gallienus was not only sending out a message that his 
military campaigns would be successful, but also intentionally alluding to 
a connection with the past glory years  of Augustus, Hadrian and Marcus 
Aurelius.  The peace and prosperity Rome enjoyed during the ‘golden 
age’ of Augustus was always the bench mark for emperors that followed it 
during the imperial age, and Gallienus was no different in trying to attain 
the same level of achievement for his own reign.  Gallienus may have 
been desperate to remind his people of what he fought for in the name 
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of the state: a prosperous and peaceful time in stark contrast with Rome’s 
current situation.
Gallienus attempted to advertise his personal merits through the 
‘virtues’ coins.  Again, this is a practice he shared with his predecessors, 
though Gallienus may have had a more pressing reason to glorify the 
qualities that made him fit to be emperor.  Attaining his position through 
dynastic inheritance, Gallienus needed to show the people he deserved 
the throne through his own merits, which would help him distance himself 
from the embarrassing capture of his father.165  Virtues were a constant 
fixture on imperial coinage and medallions, and though some believe 
their depiction may have originally stemmed from the shield presented by 
the Senate to Augustus, proclaiming courage, clemency, justice and 
piety, there seems to be no defined canon of virtues, but there are several 
which are traditionally glorified by emperors.166 Among the virtues 
Gallienus propagated was the aforementioned virtus, as well as pietas
(duty), clementia (mercy), iustitia (justice), aequitas (fairness), liberalitas
(generosity), providentia (foresight) and indulgentia (tolerance).167  By 
claiming mostly traditional virtues, Gallienus was trying to attest to his 
legitimate rule, as well as liken himself to earlier emperors, namely 
Augustus. These coins can also been seen as another way to reassure his 
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subjects that he was capable of their protection; a competent emperor 
not only displayed military prowess, but all virtues the title demanded.
After ‘Military Representation’, the second largest category of coins 
throughout Gallienus’ reign was ‘Divine Association’.  Presenting yourself 
as a god, hero, saviour, or the medium through which divine power 
brought peace and prosperity, was a standard part of propaganda 
amongst emperors.  Hercules is one god to whom Gallienus takes a 
special liking, and numerous times he is depicted in the guise of Hercules, 
wearing the mane of the Nemean lion in one instance.168  Hercules had 
been the model of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, as well as being 
popular amongst the Severi, and Gallienus revived this tradition in 261-262 
and again in 265.169 It seems Hercules had fallen out of favour with 
emperors since 235, and this intentional revival by Gallienus was not only 
another attempt to connect to past emperors, but probably propaganda 
directed towards the soldiers of Gaul, where Hercules was particularly 
popular because of his legendary ability as a courageous warrior, the 
chief attribute sought amongst the Gauls.170  It may also have been a ploy 
to reach out to the soldiers under Postumus’ command in the ‘Gallic 
Empire.’  Hercules was a hero who performed courageous tasks for the 
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good of others, and so by depicting himself as the demi-god, Gallienus 
presented himself as the redeemer of the Roman world.  
Besides traditional gods, Gallienus identified himself with the Genius 
populi Romani, the ancient patron god of Rome who stood by the 
Romans in time of danger.171  One relevant coin was struck in 265/6, and 
could represent an attempt of Gallienus to reestablish himself with the city 
and further legitimize his rule, portraying that he was to protect his people 
in the face of any danger.  Even more unique was Gallienus’ Gallienae-
Augustae series minted in Rome during his sole reign.  This series was a 
drastic exception to the norm by an emperor, as the portrait was of 
Gallienus with a woman’s features on the obverse.172  This bizarre coin was 
an attempt by Gallienus to appeal to his Eastern provinces.  The female 
goddess he is portraying is Allat, who was regarded as a giver of peace 
and protector of the rights of asylum and vengeance for her worshipers in 
the Palmyrene region.  This was propaganda directed at the Syrian world, 
where Gallienus was most likely symbolizing Allat, manifested as Gallienus,
giving victory to Odenathus.  As Odenathus was a vassal king of the 
Roman Empire, by extension, the coin is also a symbol of Allat giving 
victory to Gallienus.173 This coin may have also been an attempt by 
Gallienus to proclaim his special relationship with the gods, showing that 
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he transcended gender, and either sex of the deities could manifest in 
him.174  
A look at the differences between the coins minted during 
Gallienus’ joint reign with his father and those of his sole reign can give us 
insight into Gallienus’ personal ideologies, as we cannot be sure how 
much influence Valerian had during the joint reign.  The ‘military 
representation’ category decreases after 260, and becomes the second 
most numerous category next to ‘divine association’.  The victory type 
was still the most predominant of the military coins, but a shift occurs from 
specific victories and specific military units during the joint reign to victory 
in general and the overall loyalty of the troops during Gallienus’ sole 
reign.175  This is probably because Gallienus enjoyed more victories during 
his first seven years, though he still had some during his sole reign.  More 
importantly, after the catastrophe of his father’s capture in 260 and the 
chaos that ensued, it became paramount to restore the loyalty of his 
army.  It was important to proclaim victory as a general concept, which 
gained the confidence of the Empire, and also reflected the effectiveness 
of Gallienus’ leadership, which in turn could also strengthen the legions’
loyalty. 
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The saeculum aureum types continued to be one of the four major 
categories after 260, and the reference to pax was still dominant; during 
his sole reign, however, Gallienus issued a much wider variety of coins 
alluding to a Golden Age.  In addition, more references to Gallienus’ 
libertas were issued, including a series in which OB preceded the legends, 
such as OB REDDIT LIBERT (concerning the return of liberty).  This ob-
formula is thought to be an intentional reference to Augustus, who was 
the first to use such a legend.176  After Valerian’s capture, the number of 
threats to the Empire, external and internal, escalated quickly, making the 
promise of the peace and tranquility of a Golden Age all the more 
important to relay to the Empire.  
The ‘virtues’ category also remained important through Gallienus’ 
transition to sole emperor.  Virtus was still the dominant virtue, as expected 
of a soldier-emperor, but after Gallienus became sole emperor, he added 
three more virtue types to his coinage: indulgentia, clementia and 
pudicitia (modesty), going from five to eight.177  Again, as Gallienus was 
facing potentially disastrous consequences from his father’s capture, he 
desperately needed to remind the people of his qualifications as a 
righteous ruler, and he attempted to do this by attaching even more 
merits to his person.
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Finally, the ‘divine association’ category shifted in importance from 
joint to sole rule.  It includes the largest number of coins from Gallienus’
sole rule, at 24.1% of the total minted.  These ‘religious’ coin types also 
welcome ten more Roman deities to the fold: Neptune, Minerva, Liber, 
Aesculapius, Serapis, Hercules, Mercury, Janus and Vulcan join the deities 
depicted in coins during the joint reign, more than doubling the 
number.178 While Gallienus was trying to cope with a series of troubles 
during his sole reign, he evidently tried to appeal to the entire Roman 
pantheon on his coins.  Eleven of the deities now appeared as 
conservatores (protectors of the emperor), as opposed to just two before 
260.  Many of these conservatores belong to the ‘animal-series’ struck in
267/8.179 These coins feature every sort of god, accompanied by the 
deities’ symbolic animal, and the time of their minting coincided with yet 
another period of multiple threats to Gallienus’ throne from barbarian 
invasions in Greece and the Balkans, Zenobia seizing control of Palmyra, 
and Aureolus’ usurpation.  The ‘animal series’ and the proclamation of so 
many gods protecting Gallienus was probably an effort to simultaneously 
impress and reassure all of his troops, who chose individual deities to pray 
and sacrifice to.180   
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Along with expanding the coinage to include more of the Roman 
pantheon, Gallienus made an attempt to communicate with his armies in 
the East and along the Danube frontier, by identifying himself with Sol, a 
popular sun-god in the eastern armies, as well as through the transgender 
portrait of himself in the guise of the goddess Allat.  This transition shows us 
much about Gallienus and his religious views; he was certainly aware of 
other gods worshipped throughout the Empire, and openly attempted to 
associate with them as well as traditional Roman gods.  He was trying to 
connect himself, through these coins, with every possible deity he could, 
and by doing so, attempt to relate to every person within the Empire as 
well. 
The changes in the major coin categories may have resulted from 
the altered imperial landscape Gallienus now faced as sole ruler, but 
more importantly, they symbolized a desperate need for Gallienus to 
distance himself from his father’s legacy.  Communicating through coins 
that he had the support of the gods may have been Gallienus’ way to 
step away from a title merely handed to him from his father, and make it 
one invested in him divinely, which foreshadows the practices of later 
emperors, particularly Constantine.  By trying to find a religious basis for his 
emperorship through coinage, Gallienus was seeking recognition of his 
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emperorship achieved by the grace of the gods, just as Constantine was 
given his throne through the help of Christ.181
       It is evident from the coins minted during his reign that Gallienus 
attempted to give his rule a religious foundation, appealing to a wide 
range of deities that were worshipped throughout the Empire.  Though his 
worship was rooted in the traditional Greco-Roman pantheon, Gallienus 
did not shy away from associating himself with any gods or goddesses 
that were popular within any region of his Empire, such as in the case of 
previously discussed coins depicting Allat and Sol, and his involvement in 
mystery religions.  In addition, Gallienus took measures that aided the 
growth of Christianity throughout the Empire by revoking an edict of 
persecution issued by his father, Valerian.  This reversal of fortunes for the 
Christians coincides with a new emerging spirituality in the Empire, one 
seen not only in the coinage of Gallienus’ sole reign, but also in the art 
and culture he fostered in his court.
Early in his reign, Valerian was seemingly too preoccupied with 
uprisings in the East and on the Danube to pay much attention to the 
Christians.  In 257, however, he issued his first edict that introduced a 
policy of persecution.182  This first edict, as we know from the writings of the 
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Christian authors Cyprian and Eusebius, was directed at the clergy and 
ordered them to participate in a sacrifice to the Roman gods.  Failure to 
do so would result in exile, as reportedly was the case for Cyprian of 
Carthage and Dionysius of Alexandria.183  The edict of 257 also banned 
Christians from holding meetings and entering their cemeteries. The 
second edict, better described as a rescript of the first, followed a year 
later and was far more severe: it called for the confiscation of property 
and even execution of all those who disobeyed, as well as those who had 
previously confessed, but had relapsed.184  Previous edicts, such as the 
one issued by Decius in 249, negatively affected Christian followers, but 
did not mention Christians specifically.  Valerian’s was the first initiated by 
imperial authority to directly attack the Christian church since Nero.185  
The reason for Valerian’s Christian persecution is unclear; Alfoldi 
believes it was undertaken in an effort to divert attention away from the 
emperor’s troubles and onto the Christians.186  It has also been suggested, 
because the edict took aim at the higher ranking Christians’ property, that 
Valerian was after badly needed money to fund his ongoing wars, and 
chose the confiscation of Christian wealth as a remedy for his financial 
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problems.187  If the Christian persecution was profitable to the Empire, 
however, it would be reasonable to believe that Gallienus, who was not 
Christian, would also see the benefit of continuing his father’s religious 
policy, instead of reversing it.  A third explanation of Valerian’s motives is 
that his persecution was simply policy intended to stop the Christians 
within his Empire from upsetting the traditional gods.188  This strictly religious 
interpretation is acceptable, considering the dire situation the Roman 
Empire was in during the last half of the 250s.  In addition, it would make 
sense of the first edict, which, according to Eusubius’ letters, was officially 
concerned with Christians publicly worshipping traditional gods, with the 
mild punishment for disobedience being exile.189  Only after the first edict 
was largely neglected and Valerian received complaints from the Senate, 
who may have seen the Christian defiance as failure of civic duty, did he 
issue the following rescript which bore much more severe penalties.190
Whatever Valerian’s motives were, the persecution ended with his 
capture in the East.
Gallienus’ actions towards the Christian Church did much to aid the 
growth of the religion throughout the Empire, but he was by no means a 
Christian himself.  In addition, Gallienus certainly could have used another 
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source of revenue to fund the ongoing wars being waged during his sole 
reign. If Gallienus needed additional financial aid just as urgently as his 
father, and he was not a Christian, then why did he revoke his father’s 
edict? 
As previously mentioned, the embarrassment of his father’s capture 
by the Sassanid Persians made it a priority for Gallienus to distance himself 
from Valerian’s reign, and a break with some of the policies established by 
his father could help in this regard.  It is believed that Gallienus ended the 
Christian persecution about 260, which means he wasted no time in 
taking this measure after gaining sole rule of the Empire.191  This coincides 
with the sudden change of coinage starting with his sole reign; Gallienus 
was emphasizing his individuality, and making an obvious effort to 
separate himself from the memory of his father.  Furthermore, as Gallienus’ 
sole rule continued, he did not hesitate to include gods from other 
religions within the Empire, especially provinces where fighting was 
frequent.192 He may not have worshipped the Christian god, but he still 
thought it safer to avoid risking the wrath of the Christian god, while 
gaining the favour of the Christian population within the Empire, and at 
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the same time ridding himself of the unnecessary effort and cost of 
enforcing his father’s edict.193
Another theory about Gallienus’ leniency towards the Christians ties 
into his own spiritual views; Gallienus and his wife Salonina were known 
supporters of Neo-Platonic philosophy, and were patrons of the Neo-
Platonic philosopher, Plotinus.194  Plotinus’ life was recorded and his ideas 
edited by his disciple Porphyry in The Enneads, which Porphyry wrote 
around 301, more than thirty years after Plotinus’ death.195 Little is known 
about Plotinus’ early life but it is certain that his education and intellectual 
thought were thoroughly founded in the Greek tradition, which would 
have attracted Gallienus’ like-minded appreciation for Hellenic culture, 
art and philosophy.196 Some modern scholars have argued that Plotinus 
was combating Christianity on paper, wishing to spread Platonism as an 
alternative to Christianity.197  There is no record, however, of any such plan 
by Plotinus, nor is there any written work by the philosopher that directly 
attacks orthodox Christianity.198  The perceived notion of Plotinus’ hatred 
for Christianity probably came from Porphyry’s personal views; his Against 
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the Christians attacked the Christian faith at length, and because he was 
Plotinus’ pupil, it is probable that a shared view between teacher and 
student has been assumed.199  
On the contrary, it seems that Plotinus was largely indifferent to 
Christianity, and only held disdain for organized worship or sacrifices, as he 
explained to one of his followers, Amelius: “It is for those Beings [Gods] to 
come to me, not for me to go to them.”200  In addition, it seems that many 
of Plotinus’ views were similar to Christianity: “they have the same 
metaphysic-idealism; the same psychology-spiritualism; the same attitude
toward life- a sober mysticism.”201  Plotinus’ philosophy was based on the 
connection of everything in existence, and the search to find a unity 
within ourselves.  His metaphysical doctrine was based on a three-fold 
hierarchy: the One (or Good), The Intellect, and the Soul.  Plotinus 
believed that if we live a moral life free from the distraction of the body’s 
daily needs, and free of a need for explanation or reasoning, then we can 
look within ourselves and unify with the One.202  Within the complicated 
framework, later Christian concepts were influenced, especially the works 
of St. Augustine. In his Confessions, Augustine wrote about the influence 
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Plotinus had on him and described Neo-Platonism as embodying Christian 
doctrine about God and his word, the creation of the world, and the 
presence of divine light.203  
If Gallienus was a supporter of Plotinus’ teaching, then it is 
conceivable that he adopted the same indifference to Christian 
practices that Plotinus seems to have held. Furthermore, Plotinus’ 
influence may also have directly led to the end of the Christian 
persecution through his disdain for organized worship, which contradicted
Valerian’s edict, as it had ordered the Christians to partake in the 
organized worship of the traditional gods.
Plotinus and his Neo-Platonic philosophy encompassed more than 
just religious views, and his influence may have played a role in guiding 
the Empire into a new era of spiritual art and culture, a period which has 
been coined as the “Gallienic Renaissance.”204  Whether this period could 
be accurately described as a true renaissance has been argued, but it 
remains an extremely important era, not only in the shaping of Gallienus’ 
reign, but also because of the implications and influence this period 
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would have for art history.205  This period should be remembered as a 
transitional phase in art, “… the bridge between the classic and post-
classic worlds.”206 Roman art history rarely ever follows a straight line from 
one specific point to another, especially in the case of imperial 
portraiture, but a striking change occurs in the portraits of Gallienus as his 
reign progresses, and an emphasis on spirituality takes over the classical 
form that had emerged in the art of the period, coinciding with the 
emergence of Neo-Platonism.207
Gallienus had always shown an affinity for Greek culture and the 
arts. This may have been because, unlike other soldier-emperors of the 
third-century, he was of senatorial birth and well educated. Along with 
being a patron of art, Gallienus was recognized as being a skilled poet 
and orator, even by the Latin authors who discredited his rule.208  In 
addition, his efforts to be linked with great emperors from the past led him 
to appreciate and possibly attempt to replicate the art and culture of 
Augustus’ and Hadrian’s rule.209  It is not surprising then, that the art, and in 
particular the portraits of Gallienus during the early years of his co-
regency with his father, are decidedly early imperial in style. A sculpture in 
Berlin (fig.3) is a perfect example of Gallienus taking up the tradition of the 
                                                          
205 De Blois, 194. 
206 Mathew, 65.
207 Janet Huskinson, “Art and Architecture, A.D. 193-337” in The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 
XII, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge university  Press, 2005); 674.
208 H.A.  Gallieni. 6.
209 Mathew, 65.
71
portraits of Augustus and Hadrian; it features a smooth oval face tapered 
at the chin (based on the Augustan model, figure 4), and a fuller, plastic 
beard unlike those favored in the third-century, but reminiscent of the 
Hadrianic model.210  At the start of Gallienus’ sole reign a slight shift is 
noticeable in his portraiture, such as an example found in the Roman 
forum (figure 5): the head shape is still Augustan, and Gallienus still 
maintains the Hadrianic beard, but now he is featured with long 
serpentine locks, a more philosophical look favored by Marcus Aurelius
(figure 6).211 Even though this portrait is derived from classical influences, 
already there is a predominance of a flatter abstract form, and the plastic 
naturalism is giving way to a spiritual style, exemplified by Gallienus’ 
upwards gazing eyes, perhaps communicating with the heavens.212  
Finally, we see the transition from classical to late-classical style in the 
colossal portrait sculpture in Copenhagen from the end of Gallienus’ reign 
(figure 7), a new style that stresses inner beauty instead of outer beauty, 
not coincidentally the same philosophy preached by Plotinus.  The plastic 
realism is gone, replaced by an abstract work, perhaps less a portrait of a 
man than a portrait of an idea. The face is a perfect oval, with large eyes 
staring off into the distance, a window into the soul.213  This style of portrait 
                                                          
210 Diana E.E. Kleiner, Roman Sculpture (Yale: Yale university Press, 1992), 373. 
211 Cornelius Vermeule, “A Graeco-Roman Portrait of the Third Century A. D. and the Graeco-
Asiatic Tradition in Imperial Portraiture from Gallienus to Diocletian” in Dumbarton Oaks Papers 15 
(1961): 7. 
212 De Blois, 172.
213 Kleiner, 374; 
72
is replicated in the colossal statue of Constantine, produced around 315-
330 (figure 8).
The transition to the art forms that would become prominent in the 
fourth century could also be seen in contemporary sarcophagus reliefs, 
which took on a change in subject as well as a change in style.  Subjects 
like battle (figure 9) and hunting give way to more peaceful or tranquil 
images, as can be seen in a “philosopher sarcophagus”(fig.10) from 
Gallienus’ sole reign.214  Even in these reliefs a transition from classical, 
Augustan traits to the abstract, frontal and spiritual characteristics of his 
later rule is evident.
Gallienus’ support of the arts, and the artistic transition that took 
place during his reign, coincided with Plotinus’ arrival at his court and his 
influential philosophy.  Both philosophy and art had deliberate roots in the 
past; Gallienus wanted to link himself with great emperors of old through 
any means possible, even going so far as to be initiated into the Eleusinian 
mysteries and be elected archon of Athens, as Augustus and Hadrian had 
been before him.215  Plotinus too strived to honour past greatness, by 
continuing Plato’s teaching, but his own ideologies merged with Plato’s 
teaching to give birth to Neo-Platonism, and it was this new spiritual view 
that elevated both thought and art to a different level.  In Gallienus’ 
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court, Neo-Platonism blossomed and would influence philosophy and 
Christianity in the next century, just as the new styles of art were the bridge 
between classical and post-classical movements, and the precursor to 
the abstract linear style of the Tetrarchs (figure11) and the Constantinian
dynasty.216
As far as building projects are concerned, there are no major 
monuments that are known to been constructed during Gallienus’ rule, 
which probably had something to do with the constant state of war the 
Empire was in, and the need for funds to support his loyal soldiers.  An arch 
was rededicated to Gallienus between 260-268, known from the double 
inscription to Gallienus and his wife Salonina.  The arch in question was 
previously dedicated to Augustus, one more sign of Gallienus’ attempt to 
be linked with the beloved rule of Augustus.
Images were a way for Gallienus to communicate his conception of 
the emperorship throughout the entire Empire; these images acted as the 
newspapers of the day.  Upon coins, medallions, portrait sculptures and 
reliefs, Gallienus could proclaim military victories, reciprocal loyalty to his 
army, his virtues, support of the gods, and his spiritual ideologies.  The 
numismatic and sculptural remains are the most telling pieces of evidence 
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as to what Gallienus perceived as of the utmost importance at any given 
time during his reign.  
The coins minted during his rule reflect the chaotic situation the 
Empire was in.  As to be expected, an emphasis was put on military 
themes, as well as the saeculum aureum, virtues, and divine association 
themes. Gallienus was desperate to hold on to the Empire amidst 
numerous threats to his throne, which increased after the calamity of his 
father’s capture.  Beginning with the start of his sole reign, there is a shift 
amongst the four major themes of Gallienus’ coins and medallions. They 
still remain the four most prominent themes; however, there are important 
changes now that Gallienus was making the decisions without his father.  
The ‘military theme’ is as important as ever, but now emphasis is on the 
loyalty of the armed forces as a whole--an attempt by Gallienus to 
reinforce a close connection with his entire force, instead of individual 
units as had previously been the emphasis during his joint reign.217 The 
‘saeculum aureum’ theme would be present in wider variety, as Gallienus 
would herald the coming of a new Golden Age and his role as a bringer 
of peace, while connecting himself to Augustus.  The ‘divine association’ 
and ‘virtues’ themes would expand, as Gallienus tried to give his rule a 
religious foundation.  This was an important step by Gallienus as he tried to 
distance himself from the disgrace of his father.  By claiming the support of 
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almost the whole Roman pantheon and attaching even more virtues to 
his person, Gallienus was claiming his rule by divine right, and legitimizing 
his position with his own qualifications, which anticipates fourth-century 
practice, when emperors increasingly claimed their throne by the grace 
of God.218
His attempt to distance himself from Valerian also led to a change 
in fortune for the Christian community within the Empire.  While Gallienus 
probably did not have the Christians’ best interests in mind, his desire to 
disassociate himself with his father, perhaps coupled with Plotinus’ 
influence, led to an end of the Christian persecution started by Valerian.  
Gallienus’ tolerance really only put the Christians back to where they were 
before Valerian’s edicts, but it reversed the direction Christianity was 
heading in within the Empire, and started a period of about forty years of 
relative peace for the Christians, which significantly aided in the religion’s 
growth.219
Gallienus’ own spiritual and cultural views have a strong connection 
with the Neo-Platonist, Plotinus.  Gallienus enjoyed a learned upbringing, 
being born into the senatorial class, and his appreciation of Augustus, 
Hadrian and Marcus Aurelius aided in his philhellenic disposition, which he 
shared with Plotinus.  Gallienus and Plotinus shared a love of Plato’s 
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teaching as well as the classic forms of art celebrated in the courts of the 
‘good emperors’, Gallienus even being a renowned poet and orator 
himself.220  Just as Plotinus’ philosophy was a tribute to Plato’s teaching, 
the portrait sculpture and reliefs of Gallienus early reign were tributes to 
the plastic, naturalistic style of the early imperial period, leading this 
period to be called the “Gallienic Renaissance”.  Plotinus, however, did 
not simply repeat Plato’s teaching, but included his own views and 
ideologies to produce a new philosophy, now referred to as Neo-
Platonism.  Among Plotinus’ views was a stress on inner qualities and 
concepts, a sense of spirituality which began a transitional phase in the 
art produced as Gallienus’ reign progressed.  The artist played an 
important role in Plotinus’ philosophy: an artist’s vision was more beautiful 
than nature, his art an elevation rather than an imitation of the spirit.221  In 
contrast with the early Imperial style of realism, reliefs and portrait 
sculptures now attempted to capture the spirit within the figure with flatter 
forms, leading to an un-naturalistic, almost iconic look.  This phase is an 
important transition in the history of Western art, and its influence can be 
seen in the later Tetrarchy, as well as being a precursor to medieval
Christian art (figure 12).222
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The middle of the third-century was defined by emergencies that 
threatened the undoing of the Roman Empire, and Gallienus’ reign was 
arguably the most tumultuous period of all.  Yet, throughout the 
challenges his administration faced, he held onto his conception of his 
emperorship.  The Roman people needed reassurance of the security of 
their Empire, and hope for prosperity to come.  Gallienus knew the 
importance of declaring the victories and military prowess of his armies, 
the support of the gods, and his personal merits.  He needed to inspire 
confidence in his leadership to ensure the continued loyalty of the 
people.  He was also aware that, despite the growing threats to his 
throne, bringing back culture to his court was also the signature of a good 
emperor, and it seems he was insistent that his reign be more than just one 
continuous war effort.  He was a champion of Plotinus and his Neo-
Platonism, and the spirituality the philosophy conveyed was evident in the 
coins, reliefs and sculptures of Gallienus’ reign.  The presence of Hellenic 
culture and Neo-Platonist philosophy produced a transitional phase in art 
history that would be embraced by the later Empire and influence 
Christian art into the medieval period.223  Gallienus was ever trying to 
connect back to the past, to the glory years of the Empire’s golden age, 
and in doing so, he also left his own mark, one which proved to be 
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influential to his successors who continually built off the foundation 
Gallienus set down.
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Chapter 3
The third-century, including the period of Gallienus’ reign, has 
traditionally been described in overly general terms by modern historians.  
The period from the fall of the Severan dynasty (235) to the reign of 
Diocletian (284) has been repeatedly referred to as a “crisis”, “collapse 
and recovery,” and the “age of the soldier-emperors.”224  The constantly 
changing landscape of the Empire and the emperors that held power in 
this period make it difficult for any label to be completely accurate, yet 
these labels are still frequently used to group together general tendencies, 
which can be misleading when discussing individual emperors and their 
reigns.  As far as the whole period being one of “crisis”, scholars are still 
debating whether that term is accurate, as it encompasses a substantial 
amount of time, and different regions were affected by the ongoing 
problems to varying degrees.  Some did not suffer appreciable problems 
at all during this period: for example, rural sites in North Africa increased 
during the third century, and living standards remained high, indicating
that economic life in that region continued to prosper.225  The consensus
among scholars, however, is that Gallienus ruled during the worst years of 
the period between Severus Alexander and Diocletian; economically, 
politically, socially and especially militarily, Gallienus’ reign can be 
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considered one in the midst of crisis.226  In this chapter, which in part 
represents a summing up of my previous discussion, all of these labels will 
be discussed, and whether or not Gallienus’ reign is accurately defined by 
them.
The first part of the chapter will attempt to briefly define what 
makes a typical “soldier-emperor,” and discuss whether or not this label is 
appropriate for Gallienus.  There is no doubt that he was an emperor that 
spent most of his career on the battlefront, but what, if anything, 
separates Gallienus from the other emperors of the so-called soldier-
emperor period?    
The second part of this chapter will examine Gallienus’ 
accomplishments as an emperor.  Gallienus is almost always noted for 
ruling during the nadir of the third-century “collapse,” and therefore 
looked upon as being a poor emperor, and responsible for the Empire’s 
precarious situation.  This holds especially true in the works of 
contemporary Latin authors who, embittered at Gallienus’ treatment of 
the Senate, purposefully distorted the features of his reign, and 
consequently led the significance of Gallienus’ reign to be undervalued.  
While some modern authors have worked to rehabilitate Gallienus’ name, 
his role in saving the Empire, as well as his influence on the “recovery” 
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period and the fourth-century has not been heralded to the extent it 
deserves.  The bias shown against Gallienus in some texts has already 
been discussed, but by comparing him to other ‘good’ Roman emperors, 
both before and after his reign, I hope to show why Gallienus should have 
been looked upon more favorably in those same texts that blackened his 
image.  In addition, I hope to demonstrate that, even now, the 
significance of Gallienus’ reign is underappreciated.
Attempting to find all the similarities between the individuals who 
claimed the throne during the soldier-emperor period is unrealistic.  More 
than sixty men claimed the throne, both the “legitimate” (recognized by 
the Senate), and the “pretenders”.227  Even differentiating between 
usurpers and pretenders is difficult enough: when a general was 
proclaimed by his army it did not necessarily mean the Senate supported 
him, but if he emerged out of the inevitable civil war victorious, the Senate 
would have little choice to but to recognize him after that.  In the case of 
Maximinus Thrax, the first of the soldier-emperors, the Senate encouraged 
a rebellion against him even after legitimizing his reign, and then 
proceeded to call him an enemy of the state and legitimize two other 
candidates while Maximinus was still in power.228  There are, however, 
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several key characteristics of a typical soldier-emperor that are shared by 
the majority during this period.  
The first common trait of almost all the emperors and usurpers is that 
they were prompted to claim the throne by the army.  This was a central 
element, as previously discussed. The army in large part dictated affairs 
during the third-century: it was the emperor-maker.  Usurpation could 
happen under several different scenarios: if the emperor lost a battle; if he 
died and his successor was unnamed or deemed weak; or if troops on a 
particular frontier felt neglected by the emperor’s prolonged absence 
and trusted one of their own generals to be more capable.  Sometimes a 
general led his army to a great victory, and with this display of military 
competence his troops encouraged him to challenge for the throne, 
which also, through familiarity, might increase their chance for favour and 
financial gain.  Even just an assassination conspiracy by a few ambitious 
soldiers was all it took to overthrow the emperor and continue the vicious 
circle the Roman administration found itself in during the third century.  
Gallienus’ path to the throne was different; he received his power 
from the Senate, at his father’s request, before he gained the trust of the
soldiers.  Gallienus was raised to Augustus in 253 and immediately given 
the task of defending the western half of the Empire.  Dynastic succession 
was attempted a few times during the soldier-emperor period, but never 
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successfully until Valerian.  Maximinus Thrax, Gordian I (238), Phillip the 
Arab (244-249), Decius (249-251), Trebonianus Gallus (251-253), and Carus 
(282-283) all attempted to set up dynasties by having their sons named 
Augustus or Caesar to succeed them, but none of their sons lived past a
year after their father’s death, outside of Carus’ son Carinus.229  Valerian’s 
attempt at a dynasty can be deemed a comparative success, as 
Gallienus not only reigned after him for many years, but his reign was 
longer than Valerian’s, whose own, around seven years, was much longer 
than the average reign for the period.  Gallienus set up two of his sons as 
Caesar in an attempt to stabilize the dynastic succession, but both died at 
the hands of usurpers during Gallienus’ reign. 
When generals were encouraged to claim the throne by their own 
soldiers, it was clear that they had shown military prowess.  It would not do 
to elect an unworthy leader knowing that war, either civil or against 
foreign forces, was a certainty.  The emperor was expected to personally 
lead the army during a campaign, which was a new aspect of the third-
century: some emperors of the previous two centuries had been present 
during battles, but it was not entirely common, nor expected of them.  
Even if they traveled with the army, they would usually yield control to an 
able general. Antonius Pius (138-161), for instance, is recognized as a 
great emperor, but he held the throne for over twenty years without ever 
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leaving Italy, and was therefore never forced to lead the army at any 
time of unrest.230  That was no longer a luxury for the soldier-emperors, as 
they were not only expected to fight, but to be successful.  Gallienus did 
not gain his throne from the soldier’s declaration, but he certainly proved 
his mettle leading the army throughout his reign.
The second common characteristic of typical soldier-emperors was 
that they usually came from humble upbringings in the provinces. As the 
third century wore on, men from senatorial families took the throne less 
and less.  This was a product of the legions holding most of the power in 
the Empire, and it was a process also accelerated by Gallienus’ own 
reforms.  When he started giving all military commands to equestrians 
instead of senators, it marked the separation of military and civil 
responsibilities among provincial governors.  He also made it easier for 
men of humble origins to reach the upper echelons of the army, which is 
why we see a string of Illyrian (one of the more ‘rustic’ frontier regions of 
the Empire) emperors succeed to the throne after Gallienus’ death.231  
Gallienus needed capable men at the head of his forces in the midst of 
the chronic calamities he faced.  It is ironic, then, that Gallienus himself 
came from a distinguished senatorial family, seeing that his reforms 
eventually phased senators out of, what used to be, important military 
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commands for the advancement of their careers. This perceived affront 
on senatorial dignity is also the main reason for the hatred the Latin writers 
expressed towards Gallienus’ career.232
By being born to a senatorial family, Gallienus also had the 
advantage of a good education.  A typical education of a Roman 
aristocrat would include lessons in Latin grammar, Greek language and 
literature, law, rhetoric and philosophy.233  It was his education that 
probably first exposed Gallienus to the Greek culture and philosophy of 
which he would later be a champion, as he tried to fashion his rule in the 
likeness of those of Marcus Aurelius and Hadrian before him. 
The third characteristic of a typical soldier-emperor is a by-product 
of the first two: the emperors and pretenders were almost always 
generals.  Constant war and the importance of the army to the position of 
the emperor and the safety of the Empire meant the soldier-emperors 
needed to be excellent generals, and most of them were little else.  
Perhaps it is because of the constant warfare that no emperor made any 
significant changes to the army, administration or economy of the Empire 
until Gallienus, but it can be argued that Gallienus was busier than all of 
them, facing more opponents than any emperor of the period before 
him, and often simultaneously.  Gallienus’ quick reorganization of the 
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army facilitated a mobile defense system that could combat the 
repeated attacks and uprisings that took place across the vast Empire.  
Coupled with his keen eye for able generals and a realization that 
alliances were a necessity, he did not let the Roman Empire collapse, a 
feat considered “…one of the miracles of history.”234  His efforts to improve 
his court extended to the cultural sphere as well (discussed above and in 
chapter three), as he fostered the arts and allowed Neo-Platonism a 
central stage upon which to expand.  Aurelian (270-275) is also noted for 
his reforms, especially regarding the economy and administration, which 
makes these two emperors, out of the entire period, exceptional in that 
regard.235
The fourth characteristic of a soldier-emperor was a typically short 
reign.  The constant turnover of emperors led to a very unstable 
administration, and a vicious cycle the Empire would not emerge from 
until the reign of Diocletian, when his organization of the tetrarch system 
lent some stability to the succession process.  Out of all the claimants to 
the throne from 235-284, modern scholars recognize a little more than 
twenty that were “legitimate” emperors, and the average span of their 
reigns was approximately 2.3 years, the lowest average length of rule of 
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any period since Augustus.236 This might be one of the most remarkable 
distinctions of Gallienus’ reign.  Not only was it an impressive fifteen years, 
eight as sole emperor, but it came at the height of the ‘crisis’, a testament 
to his abilities and his resiliency as emperor.
The last shared trait of typical soldier-emperors was the means of 
their death.  As they were promptly raised by the sword, they all died by 
the sword, and the quick turnover of emperors was the hallmark of the 
soldier-emperor period.  Of all the emperors and pretenders, only three 
died of natural causes.  Hostilian (251) and Claudius Gothicus (270) both 
perished from the plague while in power, and the official report on Carus’ 
death (283) was that he was struck by lightning: however, that might have 
been a cover up fabricated by one of the beneficiaries from his death.237  
The rest of the soldier-emperors either died in battle, were killed by their 
own troops before a battle even began, or in the case of Valerian, while 
in captivity.
Gallienus did not escape this same fate; he was killed by his trusted 
officers while besieging the usurper Aureolus at Milan.238   Gallienus’ case, 
however, is exceptional compared to what we know about the other 
emperors that were killed by their own troops from the ancient sources.  
Trebonianus Gallus (251-253), Aemilian (253), Quintillus (270), Tacitus (275-
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276), Florian (276), and Probus (276-282) were seemingly killed by their own 
men who were unhappy with their leadership, or simply thought it was a 
better option to join the opposing general than fight for their emperor.  
Gallienus was murdered when a few individuals carried out a conspiracy 
against him, but the whole of the army was outraged at the news of their 
beloved emperor’s demise.  Victor records that Claudius forced the 
Senate to deify Gallienus, but that is probably a false report made in an 
effort to show Claudius in a favorable light, something Victor and the HA 
does repeatedly.239  It is conceivable that Gallienus was deified in order to 
pacify the enraged army, in addition to Claudius’ continuation of 
Gallienus’ attack on Aureolus, as a signal that he aimed to continue 
Gallienus’ policies.240  The anger displayed by the army after hearing of 
their emperor’s demise, and the subsequent actions taken to appease 
them, show that Gallienus was much beloved amongst his troops, even 
after a reign filled with an unprecedented amount of uprisings and military 
challenges--surely the mark of an admired military leader.
Gallienus was emperor in the middle of the soldier-emperor period, 
and he certainly possessed military skill, but he was not ‘one-dimensional’, 
unlike most other rulers during this period.  He was of senatorial stock, 
raised to power by his father and the Senate, and was well educated.  It 
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was this background that exposed him to the Hellenic culture of the past 
and fed a desire to replicate the glorified reigns of past emperors from the 
first and second-centuries, so he championed culture and philosophy in 
his court.  The length of his reign alone is extraordinary compared to the 
other emperors within this period, and speaks to his abilities as emperor.  
Gallienus is remembered for being part of this ‘military anarchy’ of the 
third-century, when being an emperor required that one also had to be a 
soldier, and in this capacity, given the amount of military challenges he 
faced, he proved more capable than many of the other “soldier-
emperors”.  Furthermore, he championed an artistic and cultural revival in 
the midst of his reign, making him anything but typical for this period.
What Gallienus was able to accomplish during his reign and how his 
emperorship as a whole is viewed is still a controversial subject. The 
unreliability of the ancient sources for this period has been a recurring 
theme in this work, and it will be addressed here again.  The material for 
the whole of the mid-third century is questionable, and the biographies of 
the emperors are often colored either favorably or unfavorably, 
according to the author’s preference, but for Gallienus in particular, they 
are excessively negative.  The Latin authors distort his effectiveness as 
emperor and deliberately work to find fault in his character through 
misrepresentations and fabrications throughout their histories.   Some 
modern scholars have made strides in reevaluating the importance of 
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Gallienus’ role in the third-century but still fall short in recognizing the 
significance of what he was able to accomplish.
Three main Latin sources for the third-century are particularly hostile 
towards Gallienus: Aurelius Victor, Eutropius, and especially the author of 
the HA.  Dissecting the negative hyperbole concerning Gallienus in their 
works reveals that Gallienus was not only a much better emperor than 
they suggest, but that he had characteristics which the authors 
themselves deemed were necessary to be a “good” emperor.
It is commonly accepted that all three of the above Latin sources, 
amongst others, copied a single source from the first half of the fourth 
century, the so called Kaisergeschichte (KG).241  The KG is a lost work, but 
it is believed to have been a set of short imperial biographies styled in the 
same way as Eutropius’ work.  In addition, the KG was almost certainly 
written by someone from within the senatorial aristocracy, so it comes as 
no surprise that an unjust view of Gallienus was propagated within the 
text, which only became more exaggerated by the Latin authors that 
used the KG as a basis for their own histories.242
The HA repeatedly states that Gallienus used excessive and 
extreme cruelty when dealing with usurpers and the legions that followed 
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them.243  Cruelty is an attribute of a bad emperor, according to the 
ancient sources, so it is easy to see why the HA would accuse Gallienus of 
it.  Other sources, however, do not record these acts of cruelty, and 
Zonaras and Ammianus Marcellinus record the contrary, that Gallienus 
showed clemency, even to those not deserving it: “[Gallienus] was the 
object of many genuine plots by rebels…yet on some occasions he 
punished capital crimes more mildly than they deserved.”244
All three Latin authors accuse Gallienus of involving himself in 
shameful indulgences and being too inactive.  This must have stemmed 
from the KG, but what the indulgences were are not clear.  Eutropius says 
Gallienus “abandoned himself to all manner of licentiousness,” which 
Victor took further by claiming Gallienus kept the company of pimps and 
drunkards, as well as spent too much time with both his wife and Pipa, the 
daughter he received as part of his deal with the Marcomanni in 258.245  
These accusations do not show up in other works such as Zosimus and 
Zonaras, and Pipa (chapter two) was more than likely a hostage, to keep 
the Marcomanni at their word, rather than a concubine.246 The 
description of Gallienus’ vices follows the same tradition that describes 
other “bad” emperors like Verus (161-169) and Nero (54-68), another 
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attempt to sully Gallienus.247 The author of the HA takes exception to 
Gallienus’ oratorical skills (“But it is one thing that is desired in an emperor, 
and another that is demanded of an orator or poet”), yet according to 
the same author, such learned culture was one of the things which made 
Marcus Aurelius great. In addition, when Victor speaks of the merits of 
Septimius Severus, he mentions his devotion to oratory and all the liberal 
arts. 248 The bias of the authors is apparent, as oratorical skills are a virtue 
for a favored emperor, while being a stain against Gallienus. 
All three Latin authors mention his laziness or inactivity, and 
considering Gallienus was constantly fighting wars on the frontier for the 
first ten years of his reign, it can be assumed they were referring to the 
only three years of relative peace that Gallienus was afforded (262-265).  
Their scorn might come from the emperor staying in Rome during this 
period while Odenathus held the East and Postumus held the West. It 
should be noted, however, that Postumus made no effort to invade Italy 
at any point while he held the West, a reason why Gallienus always made 
other uprisings throughout the Empire a priority over dealing with 
Postumus.  Even though Gallienus did not want a divided Empire, 
Postumus was still defending the northern frontier in the name of Rome, 
and in so doing gave Gallienus one less area to worry about.  Odenathus, 
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on the other hand, was working in the name of Gallienus, even if in 
practice he held an autocracy, and showed unwavering loyalty to the 
Roman emperor.  Odenathus was extremely useful to Gallienus at the 
height of the military crisis, fighting not only usurpers, but having success 
against the Sassanids as well.  Palmyra was never a threat to the Roman 
Empire until Odenathus’ death, at which point Gallienus was preoccupied 
with other wars and never got around to dealing with Odenathus’ 
successor before his assassination in the same year.249 Furthermore, while 
Gallienus was in Rome during these few peaceful years, it is plausible that 
he was letting his men rest after ten years of continuous fighting, and 
perhaps he was trying to replenish the army’s depleted manpower.  This 
military inactivity did not last long, however, as Gallienus marched on 
Postumus again in 265.250
For the author of the HA, the accusation of laziness may have 
concerned Gallienus’ inability to save or avenge his father.  As is a 
common method used with other emperors in the HA, the author 
attempts to make Gallienus look unworthy to rule by stressing the 
worthiness of those around him, including Valerian, Postumus, Odenathus, 
Zenobia, and even some of the pretenders.251  The HA is the only source to 
make continual and complimentary references about Valerian, and goes 
                                                          
249 Potter, “Empire at Bay,” 260.
250 De Blois, 7.
251 Cam Grey, “Civil War? What Civil War? Usurpers in the Historia Augusta,” in Citizens of Discord
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 94.
94
further by projecting the disgrace of the father onto the son for not 
rescuing him.  The calamities of 260, however, would not have allowed 
Gallienus to go running off to save his father or avenge his death without 
putting the rest of the Empire at risk, and after the fighting had temporarily 
subsided in 262, it was too late.
Making Gallienus’ successor look better through the former’s 
alleged shortcomings may have been another driving force behind 
Victor’s biased portrayal of Gallienus as well.  Victor was writing in the time 
of Constantius II, and flattering the current emperor, who might been 
Victor’s patron or even promoted Victor during his reign, is a telling 
motive.  Making Gallienus’ successor Claudius II look more competent 
would reflect well on Constantius II who, through the earlier claims of 
Constantine, counted Claudius II as an ancestor.  Victor even went so far 
as to leave Claudius out of the conspiracy to assassinate Gallienus, 
though both Zosimus and Zonaras count Claudius as a key member of the 
plot.252
Many of the weaknesses attributed to Gallienus by the three Latin 
writers seem unfounded, and can be counted as greatly exaggerated or 
purely fabricated.  It is impossible to say definitively whether any of these 
author’s claims are true, but the portrait of Gallienus they project 
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contradicts all that we know of the majority of his reign.253  The facts of 
Gallienus’ reign suggest that he displayed many of the virtues that a 
“good” emperor was supposed to have.  For a close comparison, we turn 
back to Marcus Aurelius, universally accepted by ancient authors as one 
of, if not the best of emperors.  Among the qualities that made Marcus 
Aurelius great were his nobility, his love and practice of philosophy, his 
military mind, his extensive learning, his shared rule with his brother, and 
the flourishing of fine arts during his reign.254 Similarly, Eutropius notes 
Marcus’ noble birth, sharing power with his brother, his devotion to 
philosophy, his education, and his clemency.255 The HA has many 
accolades to bestow on Marcus Aurelius: among them are his devotion to 
philosophy and culture, his noble lineage, his good education, and his 
kindness.256
If the negative hyperbole that these Latin authors use in discussing 
Gallienus and his reign is stripped away, one is left with most of the same 
virtues that made Marcus Aurelius a “good” emperor.  Gallienus came 
from a noble family, he was well educated, more than capable in war, 
and a champion of philosophy and culture. Ammianus Marcellinus, who 
was no advocate of Gallienus, even attested to his clemency and 
kindness, as noted above.  The two emperors’ reigns share more 
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similarities: they both dealt with ‘barbarian’ tribes that proved much more 
capable than the ones their predecessors had faced, they both shared 
power with a colleague that they outlasted, and continued to reign 
successfully on their own, and they both had to deal with the outbreak of 
the plague, further complicating the problem of military manpower.257
The Latin authors, writing in the latter half of the fourth century, 
could look back at the poor condition the Empire was in during Gallienus’ 
reign, and all too easily attach blame to the emperor that “held the 
rudder of the state”, but it is conceivable their portrayal of Gallienus 
would have been vastly improved if they had been impartial in their 
writing.258  The major difference between Marcus Aurelius and Gallienus 
was in their handling of the Senate; Marcus appeared to show respect to 
and work with the Senate, while Gallienus appeared to insult the senators 
by stripping them of ancient rights.  This, however, was because of the 
desperation of Gallienus’ time; Marcus had the good fortune to come into 
power during the height of the Roman Empire, while Gallienus held the 
throne during its darkest hour.  With their preexisting bias, however, it was 
not difficult for the Latin writers to scapegoat Gallienus in response to his 
treatment of the Senate.  Upon comparison, and by examining their own 
definitions of a “good” emperor, it is evident that Gallienus should have 
                                                          
257 Birley, “Marcus”, 155.
258 Alfoldi, A. 223.
97
earned his place amongst the other capable emperors, such as the great 
Marcus Aurelius.   
Modern historians have done much to right the distorted 
conception of Gallienus and his reign that the Latin authors, and those 
who accepted their views, left behind.  Andreas Alfoldi, in particular, has 
striven to redefine the importance of Gallienus’ reign.  His views on the
role that Plotinus and Neo-Platonism had during this period and the period 
to come, however, are not sufficient.  Alfoldi argues that Gallienus and 
Plotinus attempted to fight Christianity, but there is no mention of this plan 
in the extant sources, and no evidence that Plotinus disliked or wished to 
fight Christianity at all.259  While Alfoldi notes the connection between 
Plotinus’ philosophy and the art of the time, he concentrates on the 
revival of Classicism and the “Gallienic Renaissance” of Hellenic culture.260
While this is certainly important, he neglects to fully appreciate the 
influence that Neo-Platonism would have on Christianity and Byzantine art 
in the coming ages.  Under the patronage of Gallienus, Neo-Platonic 
philosophy had an integral role shaping the future of Christianity and the 
expression of spirituality in Christian art.  Instead of openly combating 
Christianity, Gallienus’ policies would give the Christian community a kind 
of legal status it previously lacked; the forty years of peace that the 
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Church enjoyed after Valerian’s capture, which was initiated by Gallienus’ 
measures, let Christianity flourish.  Plotinus’ philosophy helped define the 
Christian doctrine, as discussed in the previous chapter. Plotinus’ teaching 
influenced and was frequently borrowed in the works of St. Augustine, 
who in turn was one of the “chief ‘Doctors’ of the Latin Church.”261  In 
addition, Plotinus’ view of art and the artist would be fully embraced by 
Christian and Byzantine artists.262
Other authors have given attention to Gallienus in the last fifty years.  
Lukas De Blois’ extensive study, The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus,
thoroughly summarizes the relevance of Gallienus’ reign, but also works to 
undermine the accolades that scholars such as Alfoldi have bestowed 
upon the emperor, claiming that some of his accomplishments are 
overstated.263  De Blois, while noting the impact Gallienus’ reorganization 
of the army had on keeping the Empire from collapsing, takes exception 
to the application of the term ‘reform’ for his strategy.264 In his opinion, a 
reform had to be an intentional and thought-out process, and what 
Gallienus did by creating his mobile cavalry unit, his defense-in-depth 
strategy, and his militarization of the government was just a pragmatic 
reaction to trouble, and a mere step forward in the defense of the 
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hinterland.265 The idea that the reforms were a reactionary measure is 
acceptable, but should hardly detract from what Gallienus 
accomplished; on the contrary, the fact that Gallienus was able to come 
up with such an effective way to combat the chronic uprisings of his reign 
without the luxury of time to thoroughly plan is even more impressive.  The 
reorganization of the military and its command structure was the saving 
grace of an Empire on the brink of destruction.  The fact that Gallienus’ 
successors, who are considered as part of the ‘recovery’ phase of the 
period, used and expanded his blueprint speaks to the effectiveness of his 
strategy, and the debt his successors owed him.
Claudius II and Aurelian both maintained Gallienus’ separate 
cavalry force, based on a nucleus of Dalmatian and Mauretian troops, 
which, according to Zosimus, played a major role in helping Aurelian 
finally defeat Zenobia.266  The use of equestrian-rank provincial governors 
continued under Diocletian, as well as an attempt to preserve the role of 
an independent field force featuring a large body of cavalry. Constantine 
also continued the deployment of a field army which was distinguished 
from frontier troops, and reestablished Gallienus’ policy of an elastic 
defense-in-depth system, where troops were stationed in the interior of the 
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Empire to stop waves of invasions and allow quick movement to problem 
areas on the frontier.267
De Blois describes Gallienus’ financial administration as the darkest 
aspect of his reign, and Gallienus certainly did not help the downward 
spiral the economy was in, but he inherited an Empire that had already 
been surviving off coin debasement, and he had little opportunity to 
improve the situation.  His reign saw an unprecedented rise in military 
conflict, both internally and externally, and the only way to ensure he had 
the soldier’s support was to pay them by any means possible, and that 
meant an acceleration of coin debasement.  It would be left to Aurelian
to attempt to reform the financial policy of the Empire, but it was not until 
the Tetrarchy that some stabilization was achieved.
De Blois also concludes that a weakness of Gallienus was his inability 
to see the potential danger of betrayal in giving his Illyrian generals so 
much power.  He also believes that part of Gallienus’ policy to separate 
civil and military command and remove the Senate from military posts 
arose from his desire to check the Senate’s power, and lessen the chance 
that they could organize against him.268  It is improbable that Gallienus, 
who had grown up in the third-century and had previously been forced to 
deal with usurpers during his joint reign with his father, would not realize 
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the potential risk of further treachery at the hands of his own men.  
Alternatively, well aware of the risk, an emperor would have to make a 
choice; either risk the safety of the Empire by empowering lesser men to 
lead the soldiers, or risk your own personal security by trusting men 
capable enough to defend the Empire, and therefore capable of 
revolting against the throne.  Gallienus chose the latter by promoting 
generals that had proved themselves capable. It could be no secret that 
revolt at their hands was a possibility, which proved to be the case in 
some instances, but it should also be noted that these men won numerous 
victories in the name of Gallienus and the Empire, and Gallienus was able 
to defeat even those that did revolt until he fell to an assassination plot.  
The notion of trying to keep the Senate from gaining power doesn’t seem 
plausible either, as the Senate had long before lost the power to raise 
emperors, and was now just a formality in the legitimizing process: some 
emperors didn’t even bother asking for their acclamation in the Roman 
Senate.269  Gallienus held no ill-will toward the Senate, and he was simply 
doing what was necessary for the survival of the Empire. During his reign, 
capable men were needed to lead the army and protect the provinces, 
and that meant men with a substantial military background, not senators.
The dearth of sources at our disposal for Gallienus’ reign make 
piecing the entire picture together a near impossible task, even more so 
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when those sources are anything but objective.  The biased views of the 
Latin authors have been much discussed by modern historians, and we 
are now able to better decipher what is most probably fact from fiction.  
In comparing the reign of Gallienus to an emperor who, in the sources, is a 
universally acknowledged “good” emperor (Marcus Aurelius), we find too 
many similarities in their character and reigns to ignore the fact that 
Gallienus should be included amongst the ranks of the “good” emperors. 
Even modern authors, who have done much to build a more accurate 
depiction of Gallienus’ reign, are still too modest in their assessment of his 
feats.  Gallienus is entrenched as a figure in the “collapse” of the Roman 
Empire, but without his reforms his successors may not have ever reached 
the “recovery” period.
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Conclusion
Gallienus’ achievements are easily overlooked when looking back 
at the state of the Empire during his reign; as Michael Grant noted, “the 
fact that the Roman Empire did not collapse in the 260s or 270s AD is one 
of the miracles of history.”270  The Empire had been in a state of decline for 
some time before Gallienus gained the purple, and it was under his rule 
that the culmination of catastrophes reached its zenith.  The Empire did 
not collapse however, due to capable leadership and the ingenuity of 
Gallienus’ policies.
No emperor before Gallienus had to deal with the imposing number 
or strength of the threats to the Empire that relentlessly arose from 253-268.  
The Germanic tribes had formed into formidable coalitions (Alamanni, 
Goths, Franks) who had learned from Roman weaponry and techniques
to offer a better-equipped enemy than ever before.271  The Sassanid 
Empire in the East was far more aggressive than the Parthians they 
conquered in 224, and eagerly wanted to reclaim Roman lands they felt 
were rightfully theirs.272  The number of internal threats alone were 
alarming, as usurpers continually tried to take advantage of the 
calamities Gallienus was faced with. Resources were scarce and the 
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troops, the most important entity to an emperor in the third century, were
only loyal if they were regularly compensated for their services. In 
addition to this dire situation, Gallienus’ father, Valerian, who was joint 
emperor and in charge of the East, was captured by the enemy, an 
unprecedented disgrace to the Roman Empire, and one hindrance that 
Gallienus would have to overcome.
The Empire, against all odds, did not collapse; instead, it weathered 
the storm, and ultimately began recovering some of its power and 
stability, and that was due to the capability of Gallienus.  First and 
foremost Gallienus was a successful military leader.  The precise number of 
battles, along with which specific enemies he personally commanded
against is unknown for certain because of the unreliability of the sources, 
but enough campaigns are recorded to know he was almost always 
victorious.  His biggest failure was not a defeat in battle, but rather not 
being able to finish off Postumus and reunite the Western Empire.  In 265, 
Gallienus had gained an advantage over Postumus during a campaign 
and was besieging the usurper in Gaul (the city in question is unknown for 
certain), when an arrow wounded him as he rode too close to the walls, 
and so he was forced to abandon the siege.273
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What made Gallienus such an effective emperor when it came to 
defending the Empire was an eye for talented generals, a sense of the 
weaknesses of the imperial defense system, and an ability to choose 
negotiation and delegate command when it suited his purpose.  The 
continual and simultaneous threats across the Empire made it impossible 
for Gallienus to be present at every conflict, so being able to choose men 
who were talented and experienced enough to lead the legions to 
victory was a crucial skill.  These men were trusted to defend the Empire in 
the emperor’s stead, and did so admirably, even if their success would 
later lead to revolt against him. Gallienus made proper choices for the 
sake of the Empire, not his personal safety.
The creation of the independent cavalry contingent was a key to
the successful defense of the borders.  Gallienus realized that a rapidly 
moving separate force was the only way to combat invasions spread out 
along the frontier.  The effectiveness of the mobile cavalry unit was noted 
by Gallienus’ immediate successors, and even if it was dispersed 
sometime after Gallienus’ death, it nonetheless served as the precursor to 
Diocletian and Constantine’s comitatenses of the late Empire.  
Gallienus also reorganized the border system of the Empire.  
Realizing he did not have enough troops to defend the static border of 
old, he integrated a defense-in-depth system, an elastic defense strategy 
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that would allow strategic points within the hinterland to stop the waves of 
barbarian invasions.  This system would be abandoned by Diocletian, but 
again, the elastic system Gallienus employed heralded the defense 
strategy Constantine would use when faced with similar threats. 
With the lack of resources and manpower to sufficiently counter 
multiple invasions or uprisings, making alliances was, at times, the best 
option for the defense of the Empire, and one that Gallienus used to his 
advantage.  His agreement with the Marcomanni in 258 allowed Gallienus 
to take his troops elsewhere while the Germanic tribe defended Pannonia 
from further invasions, and his alliance with Odenathus was especially 
fruitful.  Odenathus accepted Gallienus’ invitation of an alliance around 
261, and won important victories in the East in the name of Rome against 
usurpers and the Sassanids.  These allies relieved pressure on the 
overstretched Roman legions, and were instrumental in preserving the 
Empire.
Military needs dictated the administrative changes Gallienus 
enforced as well.  Senators were no longer exclusively chosen for high 
commands of the army.  These posts were transferred to men of the 
equestrian class, men who were trusted by Gallienus and had risen up 
through the ranks, proving themselves to be capable to command 
legions and defend the Empire.  In doing so, Gallienus accelerated the 
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professionalization of the army and the social mobility of soldiers.  This was 
also a forerunner to the rank system of the late Imperial period, wherein it 
was possible to start off in the lower ranks of the army and eventually 
achieve senatorial status.  
This perceived slight to ambitious senators, who traditionally used 
high military and provincial command posts to further their careers, was 
the basis of the bias shown by Latin historians towards Gallienus.  It was 
from within this group that the tradition developed from which the Latin 
authors drew.  Gallienus did not adopt his administrative measures to 
directly attack the senatorial class, from which he came, but rather as a 
necessary measure to ensure the Empire’s safety.  It was a time of 
desperate need for military competence, and only those who had 
sufficient experience and skill were fit to lead.
The numismatic evidence from Gallienus’ reign reflects the 
importance placed on the military between 253 and 268, as the majority 
of the coins and medallions produced within the period are militaristic in 
theme.  These coins speak, not only of the constant warfare afflicting the 
Empire, but of the need for Gallienus to bind the army to himself.  The 
loyalty of the army was paramount to Gallienus’ throne, and he made 
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concerted efforts to appease individual units (the cavalry in particular) by 
honoring them on coins to ensure their allegiance.274
The coins minted during Gallienus’ reign also revealed his 
conception of the emperorship.  Gallienus portrayed himself as a bringer 
of peace, much in the style of Augustus and Hadrian, to bring a 
confidence in his rule to the citizens and soldiers of Rome.  The subjects of 
the Empire needed to believe that Gallienus was fit to rule, and he tried to 
accomplish this through the coinage minted during his reign, which is 
evident in two of the other major coin themes minted during his reign, the 
saeculum aurem types, and virtues types.
The last major coinage theme was divine association.  These coins 
served to exhibit Gallienus’ religious views.  He minted coins that included 
almost the whole spectrum of the traditional Greco-Roman pantheon as 
well as non-traditional gods such as Allat and Sol, a development that 
again reflected the desperate times Rome was facing, but also served to 
separate Gallienus from his father’s embarrassing capture.  By showing he 
had the support of all the gods, Gallienus was revealing that his rule was 
by divine right, not as a result of his father’s graces.  The religious basis of 
his emperorship, and more specifically the god-emperorship, was another 
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important foreshadowing of religious policy used by his successors, in this 
case Aurelian and Constantine.275
Though Gallienus appeared to be indifferent toward Christians, he 
did end the persecution initiated by his father, as he did not see the 
advantages of continuing the persecution. In fact, ending the Christian 
persecution was another way for Gallienus to distance himself from 
Valerian.  Nonetheless, the Christian faith was now recognized, and was 
allowed to prosper without harassment under Gallienus’ reign, a peace 
which lasted until 303, and a period during which Christian numbers 
increased greatly and the religion as a whole prospered.  
Gallienus sought to bring culture back into the imperial court; he 
was a learned emperor, and one who enjoyed philosophy and the arts.  
His philhellenic view was shared by Plotinus, a Neo-platonic philosopher 
who enjoyed the support and admiration of Gallienus and his wife, 
Salonina.  Gallienus’ attempt to recreate the cultured courts of the 
golden years of Rome led to a brief resurgence in the arts.  The early 
sculptures of the emperor are in the mold of Augustus, Hadrian and 
Marcus Aurelius, bringing back an early imperial style that had been
fading away in the third century.  As his reign progressed, a transition in art 
became evident, and it is very likely Plotinus’ philosophical views played a 
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role.  Plotinus preached of the inner qualities and concepts of the soul,
and his philosophy extended to art, which in the later years of Gallienus’ 
reign became pronounced by focusing less on realism and more on the 
spiritualism of the subject.  The sculpture portraits of Gallienus shifted from 
plastic, classical naturalism to a flatter, more linear form, meant to 
emphasize the inner soul.  Once again, this important transitional phase in
art would influence the coming late Empire; the linear form dominated art 
during Constantine’s reign, and continued into the mediaeval period.  
Plotinus’ teaching would also have a hand in developing the Christian 
canon, as attested by some of Christianity’s most important figures, such 
as St. Augustine, who credited the philosopher with providing some of the 
bases of their work.
The Latin authors’ work blackened Gallienus’ name in history.  A 
senatorial bias against him, which came about because of a perceived 
slight to their rank, worked to gloss over his remarkable reign and place 
the blame for a struggling Empire at his feet.  A closer look at his merits 
and accomplishments, especially in comparing him to other “good” 
emperors, should erase the negativity that was wrongly attached to his 
name. It is not sufficient to simply label Gallienus as a ‘soldier-emperor’ 
either; he differed greatly from what one might call a typical emperor of 
the mid-third century, and he was more successful in defending the 
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Roman Empire than his predecessors, and under conditions that can be 
confidently called the worst Rome had ever seen.
His achievement was not just keeping the Empire from collapse, but 
laying the foundations for his successors to build upon, and reclaim some 
of Rome’s past stability.  His military strategies and administration were his 
best contributions to the recovery of the Empire, as was necessary in a 
period hallmarked by endless war, both internal and external.  Culture 
was also important to Gallienus, and somewhere amidst the turmoil, he 
was able to champion a reinvigoration of the arts and philosophy in his 
court that would also be influential to his successors.  Gallienus was ever 
an admirer of the past golden age of the Empire and he did his best to 
emulate the past glories of Rome, but his was a drastically different time, a 
desperate time, and Gallienus had to assess and adapt to the constant 
turmoil that his Empire faced.
Gallienus’ skill and effectiveness as an emperor may have been 
denied by the Latin authors, but it was not lost on his successors.  They 
utilized his techniques and policies and with the foundation Gallienus laid, 
were able to bring the Empire back to glory.  Gallienus remains a 
controversial emperor amongst historians, and even though his reign has 
regained some of the significance that was negated by the Latin 
historians, he still is not granted the full respect he deserves.  Gallienus was 
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a remarkable emperor, his achievements were instrumental in the state’s
very survival, and his influence on the recovery and success of the later 
Empire was considerable.
Figure1. Invasions of Germanic Tribes 258
2008, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Invasioni_occidente_258
Figure 2.(Coin on Right) A coin depicting Pegasus. Common on 
coins honoring the accomplishments andloyalty of individual 
leagions, in particular, the independeant cavalry (courtesy of 
Trustees of the British Museum)
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Figure 3. Portrait of Gallienus ca. 250s (released 
as open source, 2012, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Altes_
Museum_-_Kaiser_Gallienus.jpg)
Figure 4. Portrait of Augustus (releasd as open 
source, 2007, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Emper
or_August_Louvre_Ma1280.jpg)
Figure 5. Portrait of Gallienus ca. 260, from the 
Roman Forum (courtesy of Musee du Louvre. 
Photo by Theirry Ollivier) 
Figure 6. Portrait of Marcus Aureliius ca.147, 
from Roman Forum (released as open source, 
2006, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marcus
_Aurelius_Palatino_Inv3683.jpg)
Figure 7. Portrait of Gallienus ca. 267,from 
Greec or Asia Minor (courtesy of 
http://www.romehistory.co.uk/5-crisisyears)
Figure 8. Portrait of Constantine the Great 
ca.336-337, from the Basilica Nova (photo 
courtesy of Jean-Christophe Benoist, 2007)
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Figure 9. "Ludovisi Sarcophagus." A complicated 
battle scene ca. 250-260 (photo released as open 
source, 2006, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Grande_L
udovisi_Altemps_Inv8574.jpg)
Figure 10. The so-called "Philosopher 
Sargophagus", ca. 260s (released as open source, 
2008, 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Plotinus_a
nd_disciples.jpg)
Figure 11. A porphyry group portrait of the four 
Tetrarchs, from Constantinople, ca. 300 (photo 
courtesy of Nino Barbieri, 2004)
Figure 12. "Interrogation of Christ," medieval 
christian art ca. 12th century (courtesy of The 
Walters Art Museum) 
116
Primary References
Ammianus Marcellinus. Trans. John C. Rolfe. London: W. Heinemann, 1935-
1939.
Augustine. Confessions. Trans. E.B. Pusey. London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 
1907.
Aurelius Victor. De Caesaribus. Trans. H.W. Bird. Liverpool: Liverpool 
University, 1994.
Cassius Dio. Dio’s Roman History. Trans. Earnest Cary. 9 vols. London: 
Heinemann, 1927.
Eusubius. Ecclesiastical History. Trans. Kirsopp Lake. London: W. 
Heinemann, 1926-32.
Eutropius. Breviarium. Trans. H.W. Bird. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
1993.
Lactantius. The Manner in Which the Persecutors Died. Trans. Sir David 
Dalpymple. Edinburgh: Printed by Murray & Cochran. for T. Cadell, 
London, MDCCLXXXII. 1782.
Porphyry. ‘Life” in The Enneads. Trans. Stephen MacKenna. London: Faber 
& Faber, ltd., 1956.
The Scriptores Historiae Augustae (HA). Trans. David Magie. London : 
Heinemann, 1967.
Tacitus. Germania. Clarendon Ancient History Series. Trans. J.B Rives. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
Zonaras. The History of Zonaras. Trans. Thomas M. Banchich and Eugene N. 
Lane .London: Routledge, 2009.
Zosimus. Historia Nova: The Decline of Rome. Trans. James J. Buchanan 
and Harold T. Davis. San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1967.
117
Secondary References
Adams, J.N. “On the Authorship of the Historia Augusta.” The Classical 
Quarterly, New Series, vol.22, no.1 (May 1972): 186-194.
Alfoldi, A. “The Crisis of Empire AD249-270.” In The Cambridge Ancient 
History vol. XII, ed. S.A. Cook, et al. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1965.
Anderson, C.J.C. “The Genesis of Diocletian’s Provincial Re-organization,” 
In The Journal of Roman Studies 22, Part 1: Papers Dedicated to Sir 
George Macdonald K.C.B. (1932): 24-32.
Anton, John P. “Plotinus’ conception of the Functions of the Artist.” In The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 26, vol.1 (Autumn, 1967): 99-
101.
Armstrong, A.H. “Plotinus.” in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and 
Early Medieval Philosoph. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1967.
Bidez, J. “literature and Philosophy in the Eastern Half of the Empire.” In 
Cambridge Ancient History vol.XII. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1965.
Bird, H.W. “Aurelius Victor and the accession of Claudius II.” in The 
Classical Journal 66, no.3 (Feb.-Mar., 1971): 252-254.
Birley, Marcus. Marcus Aurelius: A Biography. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987.
Boak, Arther E.R. and Sinnigen, William G. A History of Rome to A.D. 565. 
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965.
Brauer, George C. The Age of the Soldier Emperors: A.D. 244-284. New 
Jersey: Noyes, 1975.
Burgess, R.W. “On the Date of the Kaisergeschichte.” In Classical Philology 
vol.90, no.2 (April 1995): 111-128.
118
Campbell, Brian. “The Army.” In The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed. 
vol.XII. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Clark, Graeme. “Third-century Christianity.” In The Cambridge Ancient 
History, vol.XII, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Corbier, Mireille. “Coinage and Taxation: the State’s Point of View, A.D. 
193-337.” In Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Corcoran, Simon. “Before Constantine.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
the Age of Constantine, ed. Noel Lenski. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012.
Cull, N.J. et al. Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: a Historical 
Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present. Santa Barbara, 2003.
De Blois, Lukas. The Policy of the Emperor Gallienus. Leinden: E.J Brill, 1976.
Drinkwater, John. “Maximinus to Diocletian and the ‘Crisis’.” In Cambridge 
Ancient History, vol. XII, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005.
Ferrill, Arther. The Fall of the Roman Empire: The Military Explanation. New 
York: Thames and Hudson Inc, 1986.
-Roman Imperial Grand Strategy (Lanham: University Press of America, 
1991.
Frend, W.H.C. The Rise of Christianity. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984.
Galinsky, Karl. Augustan Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Grant, Micheal. The Ancient Historians. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1970.
- The Climax of Rome: The Final Achievements of the Ancient World AD 
161-337. Toronto: Little Brown, 1968.
- The Collapse and Recovery of the Roman Empire. London: Routledge, 
1999.
- The Roman Emperors: A Biographical Guide to the Rulers of Imperial 
Rome 31 BC-AD 476. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985.
119
Green, Bernard. Christianity in Ancient Rome: the First Three Centuries.
New York: T&T Clark, 2010.
Grey, Cam. “Civil War? What Civil War? Usurpers in the Historia Augusta,” 
In Citizens of Discord. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Haas, Christopher J. “Imperial Religious Policy and Valerians Persecution of 
the Church, AD 257-260.” Church History 52, no. 2 (June 1983): 133-
144.
Hedlund, Ragnar. “…achieved nothing worthy of memory”: Coinage and 
authority in the Roman Empire c.AD 260-295. Uppsala: Uppsala 
University, 2008.
Hekster, Oliver. Rome and its Empire, AD 193-284. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University, 2008.
Huskinson, Janet. “Art and Architecture, A.D. 193-337” in The Cambridge 
Ancient History, vol. XII, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 2005.
Kleiner, Diana E.E. Roman Sculpture. Yale: Yale university Press, 1992.
Lensky, Noel. “The Reign of Constantine.” in The Cambridge Companion 
to the Age of Constantine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012.
Lim, Richard. “The Later Roman Empire.” In the Oxford Handbook of 
Roman Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Lo Cascio, Elio. “The Government and Administration of the Empire in the 
Central Decades of the Third Century.” In Cambridge Ancient 
History vol.XII, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
MacCoull, L.S.B. “Gallienus the Genderbender.” in Greek, Roman and 
Byzantine Studies 40, (1999): 223-238.
Manders, Erika. Coining images of Power: Patterns in the Representation of 
Roman Emperors on Imperial Coinage, A.D. 193-284. Leiden: Brill, 
2012.
Marrou, Henri. St. Augustine and his Influences through the Ages. Trans, 
Patrick Hepburne-Scott. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957.
120
Mathew, Gervase. “The Character of the Gallienic Renaissance.” The 
Journal of Roman Studies 33, parts 1 and 2 (1943): 65-70.
Mattingly, H. “The Mints of the Empire: Vespian to Diocletian,” in the 
Journal of Roman Studies 11 (1921): 254-264.
Mattingly. et al, The Roman Imperial Coinage (RIC) V.5, pt.1. Gallienus 27-
35. London: Spink, 1994.
Meadows, Andrew and Williams, Jonathan. “Moneta and the 
Monuments: Coinage and Politics in Republican Rome.” the Journal 
of Roman Studies 91(2001):27-49.
Mennen, Inge. Power and Status in the Roman Empire, AD 193-284.
Leiden: Brill, 2011.
Meijer, Fik. Emperors Don’t Die in Bed, trans. S.J. Leinbach. London: 
Routledge, 2001.
Michaels, P.A. “Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Byzantine Art.” in The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 11, no.1 (September, 1952):21-45.
Millar, Fergus. The Roman Empire and its Neighbors. New York: Delacorte 
Press, 1966.
Nock, A.D. “The Development of Paganism in the Roman Empire.” in 
Cambridge Ancient History vol.XII. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1965.
Parker, H.M.D. A History of the Roman World from A.D. 138 to 337. London: 
Methue & Co., 1958.
Pohl, Walter. Kingdoms of the Empire: the Integration of Barbarians in Late 
Antiquity. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill, 1997.
Pohlsander, Hans. A. The Emperor Constantine, 2nd ed. New York: 
Routledge, 2004.
Potter, David S. Empire at Bay, AD 180-395. London: Routledge, 2004.
-“Procurators in Asia and Dacia under Marcus Aurelius: A Case Study of 
Imperial Initiative in Government.” in Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und 
Epigraphik, Bd. 123, (1998): 270-274.
121
- Prophecy and History in the Crisis of the Roman Empire: A Historical 
Commentary on the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990.
Rodenwaldt, G. “The Transition to Late-Classical Art.” in The Cambridge 
Ancient History, vol.XII, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1965.
Rostovzeff, M. The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire.
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963.
Russell, Robert. “The Role of Neoplatonism in St. Augustine’s De Civitate 
Dei,” in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought, ed. H.J. 
Blumenthal and R.A. Markus. London: Variorum Publications, 1981.
Sommer, Michael. The Complete Roman Emperor: Imperial Life at Court 
and on Campaign. London: Thames & Hudson, 2010.
Southern,Pat. The Roman Empire from Severus to Constantine. Taylor & 
Francis, 2001.
Southern Pat and Dixon, Karen Ramsey. the Late Roman Army. Yale 
University Press, 1996.
Steel, Carlos. "Neoplatonism." Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Donald M. 
Borchert. 2nd ed. Vol. 6. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2006.
Todd, Malcolm. “The Germanic Peoples and Germanic Society.” in The 
Cambridge Ancient History vol.XII, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005.
Van Meter, David. “Gallienus no.34.” in The Handbook of Roman Imperial 
Coins: a Complete Guide to the History, Types and Values of Roman 
Imperial Coinage. New York: Laurion Press, 2000.
Vermeule, Cornelius. “A Graeco-Roman Portrait of the Third Century A. D. 
and the Graeco-Asiatic Tradition in Imperial Portraiture from 
Gallienus to Diocletian.” in Dumbarton Oaks Papers 15 (1961): 1-22.
Wallace-Hadrill, Andrew. “Image and Authority in the Coinage of 
Augustus.” The journal of roman Studies 76, (1986): 66-87.
Watson, Alaric. Aurelian and the Third Century. London: Routledge, 1999.
122
Whittaker, Thomas. The Neo-Platonists: a Study in the History of Hellenism.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928.
